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TAX PATENTS: AT THE CROSSROADS OF
TAX AND PATENT LAW
Linda M Bealet
I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States today, the tax practitioner community has belatedly
become fully aware of the availability of patents for business method processes
and financial transactions-including computer-driven processes that have tax-
minimizing possibilities and even tax-advantageous methods of structuring
transactions. The United States Patent and Trademark Office ("the Patent
Office") has been granting business method patents for a number of years.1
State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, a seminal case for
business method patents, was perhaps one of the earliest tax-related patent
decisions: the Federal Circuit held that a computerized system for managing
mutual funds' ? ooling of investments through a tax partnership was patentable
subject matter. In the decade since State Street, a number of business method
patents with tax implications have been 3granted, and even more business
method tax patent applications are pending.
t Visiting Associate Professor, Boston College Law School and Associate Professor, Wayne State
University Law School. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Boston College Tax Colloquium.
The article covers developments concerning tax strategy and business method patents through March 2008.
The author wishes to express her gratitude for comments of colleagues James Repetti, Diane Ring, David
Olson, Alfred Yen and Joseph Liu.
1. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, A USPTO WHITE PAPER: AUTOMATED FINANCIAL OR
MANAGEMENT DATA PROCESSING METHODS (BUSINESS METHODS) (2000), available at
http://uspto.gov/web/menu/busmethp/whitepaper.doc (discussing the history of business method patents)
[hereinafter, WHITE PAPER].
2. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (reversing
the District Court determination that the patent claim fell within either the mathematical algorithm or business
method exception). It is interesting to note that the Patent Office's White Paper asserts a continuous pattern of
granting business method patents, in spite of the purported business method exception to subject matter
patentability, claiming that "State Street merely modified the test used to determine 'statutory subject matter."'
White Paper, supra note 1, at 3 n.6.
3. See, e.g., ABA Section of Taxation Task Force on Patenting of Tax Strategies, Listing of Patents
Classified as Tax Strategy Patents by PTO (as of 06-14-08), http://www.abanet.org/tax/patents/
issuedtaxstrategypatents.pdf; ABA Section of Taxation Task Force on Patenting of Tax Strategies, Listing of
Published Tax Patent Applications Classified as Tax Strategy Patents by PTO (as of 06-14-08),
http://www.abanet.org/tax/patents/publishedtaxstrategyapp.pdf. Of course, the number of unpublished tax
strategy patent applications is likely to be considerably larger than the published list, since applications need
not be published in any case until eighteen months after submission and in many cases no publication is
necessary until the patent is granted. Anecdotal evidence, including tales of tax practitioners whose clients
have later filed patent applications on tax planning strategies that were developed in the course of the attorney-
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Needless to say, the availability of patents for tax planning methods has
come under significant scrutiny within the tax bar and accountancy
organizations, as well as the Treasury Department and Internal Revenue
Service ("IRS"). 4 That consideration began with a rude awakening to the new
crossroads between tax and patent law at a tax section meeting of the American
Bar Association ("ABA"), at which an estate planning method, using a grantor
retained annuity trust, was discussed.5 Many of the participants were shocked
later to receive a letter indicating that the method under discussion had been
patented-the Stock Option Grantor Retained Annuity Trust patent
("SOGRAT")-and that taxpayers who had set up such an entity would have
to pay a royalty or face suits for patent infringement. 6
In the aftermath of the meeting, as the existence of tax strategy patents
became better known, tax practitioners expressed deep concerns about the
novel idea of tax planning patents. 7  Understandably, those concerns reflect
typical worries of any profession in connection with fundamental changes to
the nature of the professional practice, and accompanying worries about the
costs and the ability to adjust appropriately to new considerations in
developing planning ideas for clients and the new costs associated with tax
planning in a world of tax strategy patents. 8 Changes might include the need
to conduct due diligence research on the existence of patents for similar tax
planning methods to those being proposed and the possibility of having to
consider filing patent applications to protect intellectual property developed at
considerable effort separately from client representations. The ethical
implications of tax patents are not clear. This is a special concern in the
context of recent changes to the tax provisions governing penalties and
reporting standards9 and of substantial revisions to the rules governing practice
client relationship, suggests that there may be a substantial number of pure tax-structuring patent applications
at the Patent Office that have not yet been made public.
4. See, e.g., Alison Bennett, Solomon Says Rules Not Enough to Fix Tax Patent Problem; Other Issues
Discussed, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Jan. 23, 2008, at G-6 (reflecting continuing government concern about tax
strategy patents); Alison Bennett, IRS Remains Concerned About Tax Patents as Work Continues on Rules,
Korb Tells BNA, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Jan. 4, 2008, at G-2 (same) [hereinafter Bennett, IRS Remains
Concerned]; Alison Bennett, AICPA Urges Passage of Bill to Prohibit Tax-Planning Invention, Strategy
Patents, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Nov. 20, 2007, at G-I (regarding accountancy organization concerns about
tax planning method patents).
5. ABA TAX SECTION, PATENTING OF TAX STRATEGIES TASK FORCE, available at
http://www.abanet.org/tax/patents/home.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2008).
6. Hearing on Issues Relating to the Patenting of Tax Advice before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue
Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Ellen P. Aprill, Associate
Dean of Academic Programs, Professor of Law, and John E. Anderson Chair in Tax law, Loyola Law School),
available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=view&id=5106 [hereinafter, Aprill
Statement]. The SOGRAT patent covers the use of a grantor retained annuity trust funded with stock options,
described as "[an estate planning method for minimizing transfer tax liability with respect to the transfer of
the value of stock options from a holder of stock options to a family member of the holder." U.S. Patent No.
6,567,790 (filed Dec. 1, 1999).
7. See Aprill Statement, supra note 6 (demonstrating that tax planning patents could pose a problem).
8. See, e.g., id. (addressing concerns about changes and burdens for the tax profession).
9. See, e.g., Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 110-28, § 8246, 121 Stat. 112,
203 (2007) (changing the level of confidence required for tax return preparers under I.R.C. § 6694 for advising
undisclosed positions from "realistic possibility of success on the merits" to "more likely than not"); American
Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, §§ 812, 815, 816, 819, 118 Stat. 1418, 1577-85 (2004)
(generally toughening taxpayer understatement penalty standards and replacing an older and less workable tax
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before the IRS, commonly known as "Circular 230. ' 1° In an effort to combat
marketing of tax shelters, the Circular 230 rules were modified to include strict
requirements for tax opinions that are considered "covered opinions."' "I Patent
licensing agreements, or lerhaps even tax planning patents themselves, might
come within those rules.
More significantly, the tax bar generally found it contrary to their
understanding of the tax laws that it should be possible to grant a patent on a
tax planning method developed in accordance with those laws.13  Tax planning
methods are most often specific steps for creating or eliminating entities, and
moving client assets into or out of those entities, or for creating new financial
instruments. 14  The goal is to establish business structures or issue financial
products that merit beneficial tax treatment as provided by specific provisions
of the tax laws (e.g., a tax-free reorganization under Section 368, a real estate
mortgage investment conduit ("REMIC") under Sections 860A through 860G,
or a debt instrument eligible for an interest deduction under Section 163).
These concems thus extend well beyond new difficulties in working with
clients or the worry that tax strategy patents would likely be granted
indiscriminately by a Patent Office unfamiliar with tax law, inexperienced with
tax planning, without access to critical resources available to expert tax
lawyers, and unable to recognize the broad implications of the granting of tax
strategy patents for the understanding of the tax laws, for tax compliance and
for tax administrability. Further, tax avoidance transactions have been a
shelter registration and list maintenance regime with rules that comported with a new reportable transaction
regime developed through the regulatory process); see I.R.C. § 6111 (2005) (material advisor reporting
requirement, defining material advisor as persons who advise or assist in planning or implementing reportable
transactions for fees of at least $50,000 for individuals or $250,000 if advising an entity); Id. § 6112 (material
advisor list maintenance requirement); Id. § 6662A (providing new taxpayer 20% understatement penalty for
reportable transactions with significant tax avoidance purposes, increased to 30% if not disclosed); Id. § 6700
(increasing organizer penalty for a false statement from $1,000 to 50% of the gross income derived from the
activity); Id. § 6707 (replacing $500 penalty for failure to register with penalty for failure to report reportable
transactions of $50,000 (or $200,000 or 50% of gross income derived, for listed transactions)); Id. § 6707A
(providing new taxpayer penalty for failure to report a reportable transaction, ranging from $10,000 to
$200,000); § 6708 (providing new penalty replacing $50 penalty for failure to maintain lists under § 6112 with
$10,000 a day penalty for failure to turn over information after twenty days, without reasonable cause).
10. 31 C.F.R. pt.10 (2008) [hereinafter Circular 230].
11. Treasury proposed new opinion standards for shelter opinions in 2001 but finalized other
modifications to Circular 230 without adopting those new standards. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 10.33, 66 Fed. Reg.
3276 (Jan. 12, 2001). Additional modifications were proposed in 2003 and finalized in 2004. Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 10.35, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,186 (Dec. 30, 2003) (including standards for covered opinions and other written
opinions). See generally Linda M. Beale, Tax Advice Before the Return: The Case for Raising Standards and
Denying Evidentiary Privileges, 25 VA. TAX REv. 583, 619 (2005) (discussing the Circular 230 requirements
for covered and other written opinions) [hereinafter Beale, Before the Return].
12. Linda M. Beale, Tax Patents and Circular 230 (2007) (presentation outline on file with the author,
from the May and September 2007 meetings of the ABA Tax Section). See, e.g., Jeremiah Coder,
Practitioners Discuss Intersection of Tax Patents and Ethics, 117 TAX NOTES 114 (Oct. 8, 2007) (reporting on
Beale's analysis of Circular 230 issues at Fall ABA meeting and other ethics issues raised in connection with
patented tax strategies).
13. See, e.g., Bernard Wolfnan, Letter to the Editor, Tax Strategy Patents: An Idea Whose Time Should
Never Come, 115 TAX NOTES 505 (2007) ("[C]omering an interpretation of the law and a use to which it may
be put has to be unlawful.") (emphasis in the original).
14. Evelyn McDowell, Tax Strategy Patents: Truth and Consequences, THE CPA JOURNAL, Feb. 2008,
available at http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajoumal/2008/208/essentials/p46.htm (last visited July 10, 2008).
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significant focus for two decades, 15 and patents on tax planning methods could
exacerbate that problem. In essence, patents on tax planning methods appear
inherently problematic, given the fundamental differences between innovations
in tax and, for example, innovations in designing a better manufacturing
product such as a motorcycle helmet.
Furthermore, many practitioners considered it irrational-even assuming,
arguendo, that it might be appropriate to grant patents on some tax planning
methods-that a patent could be granted on claims such as the one in the
SOGRAT patent that appeared obvious to most competent tax attorneys in the
financial products and estate planning area. 16 Most such attorneys were well
aware of the possibilities of using trusts for various client assets, including
stock options. Nevertheless, litigation in connection with the SOGRAT patent
was settled out of court a year ago based on a presumption of validity
(although the settlement order stipulated that there were facts whereby a trier
of fact might have found the patent to be invalid). 17 It is generally understood
that various users of the method ultimately paid significant royalties to the
patent holder, even though they may have developed the method
independently.
In the wake of these many concerns about tax strategy patents, the ABA
Tax Section established a task force whose objective was to consider the
implication of tax strategy patents for tax practitioners, provide information to
practitioners and respond to developments in the field. In addition, various
ABA Tax Section meeting sessions over the last two years have addressed a
number of vexing issues in connection with tax strategy patents, including the
applicability of the ethics rules, the Circular 230 rules for practice before the
IRS, the reportable transaction rules promulgated under Section 6011 of the
Internal Revenue Code ("the Code"), the Patent Office's methods of assessing
patent applications, and the appropriateness of tax planning methods as subject
matter for patents. 19 Similar discussions have taken place among various state
20bar and accountancy associations.
15. See, e.g., Brant K. Mailer, Structuring a Sale-Leaseback Transaction, 15 REAL EST. L.J. 291
(discussing the potential of a sale-leaseback transaction as a tax avoidance transaction).
16. Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the H, Comm. on Ways and Means,
110th Cong. (2003) (statement of Dennis I. Belcher, Partner, McGuirre Woods LLP).
17. See Wealth Transfer Group v. Rowe, Docket No. 3:06-CV-00024 (AWT) (D. Conn.) (Mar. 9, 2007),
available at http://tax.aicpa.org/NR/rdonlyres/D62 E55BF-474B-4E5C-94A9-AF 140F9D5604/0/WTGROWE
FINALCONSENTJUDGMENT.pdf.
18. Further information on the membership, goals, and work of the ABA Tax Section Patenting of Tax
Strategies Task Force is available at its Web site at http://www.abanet.org/tax/patents/home.html. In the
interest of transparency, the author is a member of the Task Force who has actively opposed tax strategy
patents during her participation in panels at ABA Tax Section meetings, in the development of Task Force
comments, and in an earlier article on this issue.
19. Tax patents were a significant topic of discussion at the ABA Tax Section Annual Meeting in
Washington, D.C. in May 2007, the Fall Joint CLE Meeting in Vancouver, BC in September 2007, and the
Mid-Year Meeting in January 2008 in Lake Las Vegas, Nevada. See, e.g., Coder, supra note 12, at 114
(reporting on ABA panel discussion on Circular 230 and ethics issues in connection with patented tax
strategies).
20. See, e.g., Alison Bennett, Colorado Bar Group Opposes Tax Patenting, Voices Big Support for
Legislative Remedy, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Mar. 15, 2007, at G-l; Letter from Mark E. Holcomb, Chair,
Tax Section of the Florida Bar, to Sen. Norm Coleman, Sen. Carl Levin & Sen. Barack Obama (Apr. 23,
[Vol. 2008
TAX PATENTS
Perhaps not so obvious is the intense interest of the intellectual property
("IP") bar in tax-strategy patents and the "deep divide" between the IP and tax
bars on the subject, 21 as illustrated by the two companion articles in this
22volume. Anecdotally, their response to the concerns of tax lawyers is almost
uniformly along the lines of what an IP colleague said to me early on when I
objected to the granting of patents on tax planning methods: "Get over it!"
Tax practitioners' admonitions about the inadequacy of Patent Office staff to
the task of comprehending complex tax laws that generally require substantial
study and "real-world" practice to develop expertise are countered with an
almost naive optimism that examiners can be trained through a few focused
workshops to deal with tax in the same way that they have acquired greater
expertise in the much less technical area of general business methods. 2 3  IP
lawyers frequently take an avuncular pose, comparing tax strategy patents to
other new frontiers in patent law and insisting that tax lawyers merely need to
understand the patent system better 24 so that they can pass from aversion of to
adaptation to the new demands at the crossroads of tax and patent law, just as
those dealing in computer software, communications technology or other
issues have done, leading to beneficial new innovations and economic
growth. 
25
2007), available at http://wwwvfloridataxlawyers.org/pdf/patentability taxadvice bill681.pdf;, Letter from
Todd Welty, State Bar of Texas, to Eric Solomon, Treasury Dept. (Jan. 29, 2007) (on file with author)
(recommending that patented strategies be identified as transactions of interest and patent applicants and
holders be treated as material advisors under the reportable transaction rules); Letter from Bradley M. Roof,
Chair Virginia Society of CPAs to Leslie Murphy, Chair, AICPA (Oct. 6, 2006) (on file with author) (stating
that patenting tax advice does not represent good public policy).
21. Jeremiah Coder, IRS Reg Hearing on Tax Patents Highlights Divide, 118 TAX NOTES 894 (Feb. 21,
2008).
22. Richard S. Gruner, When Worlds Collide: Tax Planning Method Patents Meet Tax Practice Making
Attorneys the Latest Patent Infringers, 2008 J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 35 (2008) [hereinafter Worlds Collide]; Max
Stul Oppenheimer, Patents, Taxes and the Nuclear Option: Do We Need a 'Tax Strategy Patent' Ban Treaty?,
2008 J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 1 (2008) [hereinafter Nuclear Option].
23. See, e.g., Lucas Osbom, Tax Strategy Patents: Why the Tax Community Should Not Exclude the
Patent System, 18 ALBANY L.J. Sci. & TECH. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 31, on file with author)
("[A]ny lack of tax strategy expertise has already been, or will quickly be, remedied"); Worlds Collide, supra
note 22, at 66 (suggesting presentations to Patent Office examiners); Nuclear Option, supra note 22, at 4-5
(finding the difficulties for the Patent Office in analyzing tax strategies no different from the problem it faced
with other fields, requiring a "learning curve").
24. See, e.g., Nuclear Option, supra note 22, at 7 ("Much of the concern arises from a misunderstanding
of the patent system, which is nearly as complex (although considerably more rational) than the tax system.").
25. See, e.g., Christopher R. Rizek, Firm Sees No Need for Proposed Regs on Patented Transactions,
2008 TNT 8-14, Jan. 11, 2008, available in LEXIS, TNT file ("[M]ainstream view, at least among intellectual
property lawyers,.., that methods of complying with the internal revenue laws are no different from other
types of business methods for complying with other legal requirements, such as environmental regulations,
pure food or drug laws, communications technology licenses, etc., all of which are certainly appropriate
subject matter for patenting."); see also David Randolph, View on Patentability of Tax Strategies Differs
Greatly Between Tax, Patent Bars, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Aug. 14, 2007, at G-5 (outlining differences of
opinion on the issue); Stephen T. Shreiner & George Y. Wang, Discussions on Tax Patents Have Lost Focus,
IP LAW 360 (July 21, 2006), http://www.hunton.com/files/
tbl-s47Details%5CFileUpload265%5CI551%5CTaxArticle IPLaw360 7-21-06.pdf ("Tax patents-which
are really just a type of business-method patent-are no different.").
Some IP attorneys appear openly hostile to the tax bar's skepticism about the validity of tax strategy patents.
One extreme example is provided by the Koresko Law Firm commentary, which reads like an intemperate
tirade against a meddling Congress and tax administration that it views as under inordinate pressure from
special interest lobbying by tax practitioners who are mostly concerned with the potential impact of royalty
No. 1]
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The IP perspective, although not monolithic, tends to two broad
conclusions. First, it suggests that the various hurdles in the patent law that
must be overcome before a tax strategy claim would be eligible to be patented
are significant and will likely prevent patentability of many claims currently
under consideration. 26  Second, assuming that some tax strategies will
nonetheless be eligible for patents, the IP perspective suggests that tax strategy
patents provide appropriate and needed economic incentives for valuable tax
innovation that implements the underlying policy of patent law to incentivize
innovation for the public good and that the tax bar's concerns do not
distinguish tax from other areas.
27
This article responds to those two main threads of IP commentary. This
Part serves as an introduction to the problem. Part II briefly reviews patent law
requirements and the history of the issuance of tax strategy patents as a
subclass of business method patents. Part III addresses recent developments in
the last year-and especially in the last seven months-that point to potential
resolutions of the issue as Congress, the courts, and the Patent Office work to
more carefully delineate the subject matter requirement for patentability and
other requirements that are directly relevant to tax strategy patents. It also
addresses the effort by the IRS to create a new category of required disclosure
for transactions that involve patented tax planning methods. Part V considers
the issues that are most worrisome from a tax perspective if, in spite of these
developments, tax strategy patents continue to be issued. Different issues arise
in respect to more aggressive tax strategies compared to ordinary tax
minimization planning strategies, but each demands a similar solution to
prevent the balkanization of the tax system. Part V concludes that the
fundamentally different purposes of tax and patent laws suggest that the
expenses on their own lucrative fees. Koresko Law Firm, A Reply to Congress: Facts and Fiction of
Legislative Proposals Regarding Patents for Tax-Related Strategies (Sept. 1, 2007), Tax Analysts Doc 2008-
4572; see also John Kheit, More Bad News at Tax Time?, BUSINESSWEEK.COM (Feb. 26, 2008), at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23335842/ (inveighing against the IRS's actions on patented transactions as a
"meddler" in a "regulatory land grab" that "would threaten an explosion of innovation and technology in the
financial-services industry that has produced astonishing productivity gains, directly and substantially feeding
U.S. economic growth over the last decade.").
26. This is the primary thrust of Oppenheimer's commentary. See Nuclear Option, supra note 22, at 2
(describing the patent law as presenting "significant hurdles to patentability"); see generally Andrew
Schwartz, Tax Strategies are not Patentable Inventions, 25 ABA IPL NEWSLETTER 35 (2006) (discussing
various reasons that tax planning methods should not be patentable).
27. See, e.g., Worlds Collide, supra note 22, at 47-49 (concluding that the innovation incentive under
the patent law overrides the various tax bar objections to patenting of tax strategy patents); Id. at 49 ("[T]he
proper scope of patent protections for new types of innovations such as new tax planning methods should be
interpreted in light of these [patent law] goals [of incentivizing innovation]"); see also Issues Relating to the
Patenting of Tax Advice: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways
and Means, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Richard S. Gruner, Professor of Law, Whittier Law School),
available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?form-mode=view&id=5105 [hereinafter, Gruner
statement] ("[P]atentable subject matter standards have been steadily expanding in scope. Federal court
standards have recognized over the past two decades that our patent system should encourage and reward
advances in fields as divorced from traditional physical engineering and chemistry as bio-engineering,
computer software, communication information processing, accounting record keeping, financial investment
strategies, and business methods. In this march towards ever broader patent system scope, it is a small step to
extend patents to advantageous tax planning methods, which produce important financial results for
taxpayers.").
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conflict must be resolved, one way or another, through prohibition of patents
on tax strategies.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF BUSINESS METHOD AND TAX STRATEGY PATENTS
Tax practitioners have become painfully familiar with the chronology of
the development of patent law governing business method patents and, in
particular, tax strategy patents. The relevant provision of the Patent Act limits
eligibility for patent protection to claims whose subject matter is a "process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof. ' '28 Patent claims must also satisfy additional conditions
to be patented, three of which-utility, novelty, and nonobviousness-are
often thought of as key requirements in the analysis. 29 Utility merely requires
that the patented invention be "useful.",30 Novelty is defeated by the existence
of prior art either before the date of the invention or before one year prior to
the time the invention was filed. 31  A patent claim that satisfies the
nonobviousness requirement would not be considered obvious by someone of
ordinary skill in the field who has complete knowledge of prior art. 3 2 Each of
these hurdles to patentability is important in assessing tax strategy patents.
The subject matter of patents represents a threshold eligibility
requirement to patentability. Business method (and tax strategy) patent claims
are typically set out as process claims, although some computerized
algorithmic applications may appear as machine claims. 33 Although certain
types of business methods that were clearly technological inventions were
patented early in the development of the country, 34 the courts and the Patent
Office have traditionally considered there to be a "business method" exception
to patentability for any business method claims that were neither scientific nor
technological. The Supreme Court, however, construed the subject matter
requirement in a series of important cases in the late 1970s and 1980s that laid
the way for the current state of business method patentability. Although it had
reiterated in Diamond v. Chakrabarty that "laws of nature, natural phenomena
and abstract ideas" are not eligible subject matter, 36 the Court nonetheless
permitted the patenting of computerized applications of mathematical
28. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
29. See id. §§ 101-103 (discussing patent requirements).
30. Id. § 101; see also infra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing utility).
31. See § 102(a)-(b).
32. Id. §103(a); see In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1021 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (describing a test for
obviousness).
33. Osbom, supra note 23, at 5 n.16 ("Process (or method) patents generally cover a series of steps or
actions, as opposed to the remaining categories which cover things having various components.").
34. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 2-3.
35. Osbom, supra note 23, at 6.
36. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) ("[Llaws of nature, physical phenomena, and
abstract ideas have been held not patentable."); see also Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (holding not
patentable a catalytic conversion method featuring a new mathematical algorithm for updating alarm limits);
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (holding that a mathematical algorithm for converting binary coded
decimal form to pure binary form cannot be patented).
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algorithms in the 1981 Diamond v. Diehr case. 3 7  Interpreting the Diehr
precedent in In re Allapat, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit finally
permitted patenting of computer programs, differentiating between ineligible
disembodied abstract concepts and eligible machines or processes by looking
to whether the claim produced a "useful, concrete, and tangible result." 31
Finally, in State Street, the Federal Circuit opened the floodgates to new patent
applications by holding business methods subject to the same patentability
requirements (novelty, nonobviousness, utility, etc.) that apply to consideration
of any other process or method.39
Some commentators have interpreted State Street to rely on the utilitz
assessment to redefine the scope of the threshold subject matter requirement.
There is thus a clear line of expansion in scope of patent subject matter from
the Supreme Court's decision in Chakrabarty permitting patentability of life
forms, 1 through the Federal Circuit's decision in State Street permitting
patentability of a computerized accounting process business method,42 and
culminating in the Supreme Court's rejection of review in Laboratory Corp. of
American Holdings v. Metabolite Labs, a case that could have provided an
43opportunity to pull back from overly generous subject matter review.
The immediate result of State Street was approval of a business
method/financial accounting patent that might force any business embarking
on a multi-tiered partnership portfolio investment structure to use the newly4
patented accounting system. An even more significant result was the
priming of the patent machinery to grant additional business method and tax
37. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184-87 (1981) (finding that an improved press for curing rubber
that used a computerized algorithm for checking the appropriate temperature was a patentable process).
38. In re Allapat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544-45 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding computer programs patentable and
asserting that "programming creates a new machine, because a general purpose computer in effect becomes a
special purpose computer.").
39. See State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The floodgates are
evident in a recent empirical study of patent applications that found that "the single largest class [of patent
applications] was class 705, covering business method and financial services patents." Mark Lemley &
Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp? 32 (Stanford Public Law and Legal Theory Working
Paper Series Research Paper No. 999098, July 2007) available at http://ssm.com/abstract-999098. This
number may be understated because many business methods patents attempt to avoid the level of scrutiny
applied to class 705. See John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987 (2003) (citing different patent procedures for business method patents as a possible
reason for this).
40. See, e.g., Robert King, Comment, Only in America: Tax Patents and the New Sale of Indulgences,
60 THE TAX LAWYER 761, 766 (2007) (stating that "State Street Bank collapses the traditional test for
determining statutory subject matter into the untenable test of whether the subject matter of the claim has any
practical utility") (emphasis in original).
41. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
42. State St., 149 F.3d at 1368.
43. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Lab., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006) (involving a patent for
testing for n vitamin deficiency based on a mere finding of A natural law correlation between vitamin
deficiency and levels of homocysteine). But see id. at 2927 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the State
Street standard is not consistent with Supreme Court precedent).
44. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 502, 514-16 (D. Mass.
1996). ("If Signature's invention were patentable, any financial institution desirous of implementing a multi-
tiered funding complex modeled on a Hub and Spoke configuration would be required to seek Signature's
permission before embarking on such a project. This is so because the '056 Patent is claimed sufficiently
broadly to foreclose virtually any computer-implemented accounting method necessary to manage this type of
financial structure.").
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patents, some of which may not include any technological component. 
45  In the
2004 Ex Parte Lundgren decision, the Board of Patent Appeals & Interferences
("BPAI") ruled that the "technological arts" test that had been followed to
distinguish patentable subject matter from non-patentable concepts was not a46
separate and distinct test for statutory subject matter. Understandably,
commentators read this as generally eliminating a "technology" requirement
for tax strategy patents.4 7
At about the same time, Patent Office Commissioner Godici
acknowledged at a Senate Finance Committee hearing on the tax gap that the
Patent Office considered tax strategies to be types of business methods that are
potentially patentable.48 In 2006, the Patent Office extended its business
method classification (Class 705) by adding a new subclass (36T) to cover tax
planning methods. 49 The Joint Committee on Taxation reported in mid-July
2006 on tax patents, noting a potential concern with tax strategy patents that do
not involve computerized application. 50  One recent study examined five tax-
related patents that are not computer implemented and concluded that the
strategies either should have failed the patentability requirements for
nonobviousness or lack of novelty, or were so clearly ill-conceived as tax
products that they would not produce the tax benefits claimed. 5' Yet as
45. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'n., Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating lack
of an "invariable requirement" for physical transformation in assessing patentability of a mathematical
algorithm).
46. Ex parte Lundgren, 2005 Pat. App. LEXIS 34, at *10-11 (BPAI 2005) ("Our determination is that
there is currently no judicially recognized separate "technological arts" test to determine patent eligible subject
matter under § 101. We decline to create one."), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/
prec/2003-2088.pdf.
47. See, e.g., King, supra note 40, at 768 ("Lundgren, when combined with State Street Bank, allows for
the patenting of tax strategies without the patent having to claim any sort of a computerization of the steps to
avoid a 'technological arts' rejection.").
48. Bridging the Tax Gap: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 108th Cong. 703 (2004)
(statement of Nicholas P. Godici, Commissioner of Patents, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office), available at
http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/95484.pdf.
49. Issues Relating to the Patenting of Tax Advice. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue
Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. 77 (2006) (statement of James Toupin, General
Counsel, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/
hearings.asp?formmode=view&id=5103 [hereinafter, Toupin Statement] (noting in July 2006 that the new tax
subclass had been "recently" added). The Patent Office uses a numerical system to classify patents and patent
applications. Most patents with tax-related claims are classified under the Business Method classification and
the tax-related patent subclass, but some patent applications with tax-related claims may well be classified
elsewhere, because of the vagueness with which claims are written and the potential desire of some patent
applicants to obscure the tax-centric nature of their patent claims.
50. See, e.g., STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., BACKGROUND AND ISSUES RELATING TO
THE PATENTING OF TAX ADVICE 2 (Jul. 12, 2006), http://www.house.gov/jct/x-31-06.pdf (noting that Patent
Office procedures had appeared to require some computerized applications "until recently" and listing the
SOGRAT patent as an example of a tax strategy patent rather than a computerized application).
51. A 2007 study by Wade Chumney examined tax-related patents and concluded that most are not tax
strategy patents but rather have tax as a secondary issue or deal with computer-implemented systems for tax
efficient investment portfolio management or something similar, while five patents were tax strategy patents in
which the creator claimed to invent a financial product that would reduce taxes, and a followup study
examines each of the tax strategy patents for nonobviousness and novelty. See ROBY SAWYERS, WADE
CHUMNEY & DAVID L. BAUMER, WHEN WORLDS COLLIDE: APPLYING THE NONOBVIOUSNESS AND NOVELTY
REQUIREMENTS OF PATENT LAW TO TAX STRATEGY PATENTS (2008) (for a discussion of the study see power
point presentation, slides 5-7, available at https://aaahq.org/ata/meetings/midyear-meetings/2008/
ppt/SawyersATAPresentation.ppt). The deferred § 1031 exchange deedshare patent discussed here, U.S.
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recently as May 2007, the Patent Office explicitly asserted that "patents will
play a role in the tax strategy industry" and "[p]atents for tax plannin%
strategies will remain a part of the patent landscape for some time to come."
The very fact that tax planning to assist businesses in properly structuring their
business activities could appropriately be considered a "tax strategy industry"
by the Patent Office rings warning bells harking to the tax shelter industry that
mushroomed through the 1990s with the aid of tax shelter promoters. 
53
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING TAx STRATEGY PATENTS
Although the number of published tax-related patent applications is still
quite small compared to the overall number of patent applications and the
number of pure strategy patents is apparently even more limited,54 the potential
for future issuance of large numbers of patents covering tax aspects of major
categories of financial and business transactions remains a significant worry.55
Three recent developments, however, suggest some possibility of relief.
Congress has seriously begun to consider enactment of legislation to ban tax
planning patents. At the same time, the federal courts in recent decisions have
pulled back from the broad approach to the subject matter, utility, and
nonobviousness requirements that appeared to pave the way for unfettered
patentability of tax strategy patents. The IRS has also promulgated regulations
to require disclosure of tax strategy patent applications.
A. Legislation Banning Tax Strategy Patents
The concerns of the tax bar echoed in mainstream media, as joumalists
reported on the "hot button" issue of patent-eligible tax strategies. A The tax
concerns augmented more widespread perceptions of patent abuses and stifling
of innovation in an overweening patent system that now appears to favor
Patent No. 6,292,788, is one that I mentioned at the first ABA tax section meeting dealing with the potential
application to patented tax transactions of the Circular 230 rules for practice before the IRS. The patent
includes tax statements one would expect in a tax opinion; accordingly, licensing agreements executed in
connection with such patented tax strategies may well be "covered opinions" under Circular 230 § 10.35 that
are subject to especially rigorous requirements and potentially subject their authors to severe sanctions from
the Office for Professional Responsibility.
52. Letter from Mindy B. Fleisher to Bernard Wolfinan (May 16, 2007), in Bernard Wolfman,
Patenting Tax Strategies, TAXES, Mar. 2008, at 43 Ex. B. The Patent Office letter also demonstrated the
somewhat flippant view ofIP specialists towards those who complain about expansion of the patent field. Id.
("Like participants in other fields where business method patents have altered the competitive landscape,
taxpayers and tax advisers must modify how they approach the risks of implementing selected tax strategies.").
53. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, White Paper: The Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters,
Discussion, Analysis and Legislative Proposals (1999), http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/
ctswhite.pdf.
54. See Toupin Statement, supra note 49.
55. The Patent Office does not publish statistics on unpublished tax strategy patent applications. The
number of business method patents surged after the State Street decision. Id. It can be expected that tax
strategy patents likewise have surged after the possibility of patenting tax planning became better known. Id.
56. AMY E. HELLER, PATENTING TAX ADVICE: GRAT CASE STIRS DEBATE, ABA RPPT EREPORT 1
(Oct. 2006), http://www.abanet.org/rppt/publications/ereport/2006/l/heller-patenting.shtml. See also Gary C.
Bubb, Commentary: Patented Tax Strategies-Are You Serious?, 35 MASS. LAW. WKLY. 2663, 2663 (Aug.
6, 2007) (noting the oddity of tax strategy patents).
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patent holders at the expense of the general public. 57  The tax practitioners'
concerns about tax strategy patents were therefore soon brought into the
several years-long, congressional consideration of major patent law reforms.
In its 2007 consideration of patent reforms, the House Judiciary Committee
58paid attention to the calls for banning tax strategy patents. The House Ways
and Means Committee held hearings that covered the complex issues in
depth. 59 A major patent reform bill, the Patent Reform Act, similar to bills
considered in prior years, was introduced in both the House and Senate. 60 In
September 2007, the House passed an amended version of the bill, which
prohibits patenting of tax planning methods; 61 but Senate action remains
uncertain.
The overall patent reform package is clearly controversial in itself. 63 The
tax strategy patent prohibition component of that package may prove too
controversial to pass in spite of the considerable support it apparently has at
this point. The IP bar objects to special legislation prohibiting tax strategy
patents, claiming that it "would run counter to the unitary nature of the U.S.
patent system, which generally applies the same rules and standards in a
technology-neutral manner."' 64 In addition to widespread opposition from the
IP bar to any ban, prohibition of tax strategy patents faces the same descriptive
difficulties that beset most tax anti-abuse proposals-how to draw lines
between acceptable business behavior and behavior that constitutes abusive tax
practices. 65  Even opponents of tax strategy patents agree that there are
accounting or computerized data manipulation techniques with tax components
that should be patentable (e.g., Turbo Tax or other tax preparation software),
but they are adamant that tax planning strategies that represent the abstract
ideas of tax planners applying interpretations of tax law to proposed
57. See, e.g., Steve Seidenberg, Reinventing Patent Law, ABA J., Feb. 2008,
http://www.abajoumal.com/magazine/reinventingpatent-law/ (quoting patent litigator James Foster of Wolf,
Greenfield & Sacks).
58. Alison Bennett, House Judiciary Panel Explains Stance on Tax Strategy Patent Ban in New Report,
DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Sept. 6, 2007, at G-1.
59. Hearing on Issues Relating to the Patenting of Tax Advice, H. Rep. Subcomm. on Select Revenue
Measures of the Comm. on Ways & Means, 109th Cong. 77 (2006).
60. Patent Reform Act of2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007).
61. H.R. 1908, § 10.
62. See, e.g., Brett Ferguson, Efforts to Ban Tax Patents at Risk of Being Watered-Down in Congress,
Attorney Says, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Oct. 12, 2007, at G-81; Sanford Warren & Brandon Lee, Prospects for
Patent Reform in 2008 and Beyond, IRMI.com (Feb. 2008), http://www.irmi.com/Expert/Articles/2008/
Warren02.aspx#6.
63. Analysis of the overall patent reform is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that it
includes substantial changes to patent requirements, among them a controversial change from "first to invent"
to "first to file" to harmonize U.S. patent requirements with E.U. patent requirements. See PatentlyO.com,
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2OO7/O4/patent-reform-a.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2008) (listing the major
changes introduced in the patent reform bill).
64. Crystal Tandon, Increased Awareness of Tax Patent Risks Needed, Say Practitioners, 115 TAX
NOTES 304 (2007) (reporting comments of Stephen Schreiner, an IP attorney in the Washington office of
Hunton & Williams).
65. See Letter from Marcia S. Wagner, Managing Director, The Wagner Law Group, to Senator Arlen
Specter regarding the Senate Tax Patent Bill (Mar. 24, 2008) (on file with author) ("The complexities involved
in integrating the operation of two of the most arcane areas of the law, tax and patents, was underestimated by
the House when it added its provision as an amendment,").
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transaction structures should not be.66  Some of those may be abusive of the
tax laws (e.g., a highly technical derivative financial product with
computerized accounting requirements that is intended to achieve an illicit
interest deduction for a profit stream considered an equity return for tax
purposes), but many may simply be undesirable as patented strategies because
they are nothing more than abstract interpretations of particular tax provisions
(e.g., a computerized method of allocating cost-recovery reductions in a
limited partnership). Most commentators do not object to tax preparation
software or even to the patenting of software that provides a method for
making necessary tax determinations that are required as basic steps in
computing tax liabilities in respect of a transaction. 67  The difficulty lies in
adopting language that clearly prohibits "pure" tax strategy patent claims that
are conceptual business structuring strategies, even though they may be cast as
requiring computerized application. Thus, there will undoubtedly continue to
be consultation and development in respect of these ideas as the major reform
package reaches a final decision, perhaps later in 2008.
Concern that the larger controversies involved in passage of major patent-
reform legislation may derail the provisions banning tax strategy patents has
led to introduction in the Senate and House of various stand-alone bills
intended to prohibit tax strategy patents. 68 Senators Baucus and Grassley, and
Senators Durbin, Coleman, and Obama have introduced two different stand-
alone bills in the Senate.69  Representatives Doggett and Boucher have
sponsored different stand-alone bills in the House. Again, the language in
the existing bills is generally quite broad. The Baucus bill, for example,
prohibits patenting of inventions that are "designed to reduce, minimize, avoid,
or defer or has, when implemented, the effect of reducing, minimizing,
avoiding, or deferring a taxpayer's tax liability or is designed to facilitate
compliance with tax laws.. . ."71 It is expected that the provision prohibiting
tax strategy patents will be offered as an amendment to the overall patent
reform bill when it comes to the Senate floor. 72
66. See, e.g., Matthew A. Melone, The Patenting of Tax Strategies: A Patently Unnecessary
Development, 5 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 437, 457-58 (2007) ("[W]hether a software program... to
determine... tax credit position is entitled to patent protection should be detennined under the standards
applicable to a business method claim in general. The inventions that raise special issues are those whose
claims are broad enough to encompass the underlying tax planning technique itself.").
67. Id.
68. See generally Alison Bennett, Baucus, Grassley, Others Crafting Legislation Solely to Ban Tax
Strategy Patents, Aides Say, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Sept. 13, 2007 at GG-I (discussing tax patents); Alison
Bennett & Carol Oberdorfer, Levin, Coleman, Obama Introduce Measure to Curb Foreign Abuses, Stop Tax
Patents, DAILY TA REP. (BNA), Feb. 21, 2007, at G-2 (reporting the introduction of the Stop Tax Haven
Abuse Act by Senators Carl Levin, Barack Obama and Ron Coleman on February 17, 2007).
69. A Bill to Provide that Certain Tax Planning Inventions Are Not Patentable, S. 2369, 110th Cong. § 1
(2007); Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 681, 110th Cong. § 1 (2007).
70. H.R. 2365, 110th Cong. (2007) (as introduced by Rep. Boucher, May 17, 2007) (limiting liability for
patent infringement rather than prohibiting tax strategy patents); H.R. 2136, 110th Cong. (2007) (as introduced
by Rep. Doggett, May 3, 2007) (prohibiting tax strategy patents).
71. S. 2369, 110th Cong. § l(b)(2)(A) (2007).
72. See Hill Watch: Tax Legislation, DAILYTAX REP. (BNA), Mar. 31,2008, atGG-11. S. 1145.11Oth
Cong. (2007). The general patent reform bill in the Senate has not yet come to the Senate floor, although it was
introduced in 2007. Id.
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In the aggregate, this legislative activity suggests that there is
considerable interest in Congress in enacting some kind of a prohibition on the
patenting of tax strategies. Even the White House has stated its understanding
of the "concerns surrounding patent protection for tax planning methods" and
its willingness to "work with Congress to address those concerns."
73  The
context of a large and controversial patent reform bill makes it more difficult,
however, to predict the final legislative outcome.
B. Court Cases on the Determination of Subject-Matter Eligibility and
Nonobviousness for Business Method Patents
Another series of important recent developments have taken place in the
courthouse. The first is a more nuanced understanding of the obviousness test
for patentability, briefly addressed in Part III.B. 1 (and discussed further in the
context of Patent Office competence to analyze tax strategy patents for
obviousness, in Part IV.B. 1). The second is the apparent narrowing of subject
matter standards under recent Federal Circuit decisions, addressed in Part
III.B.2.
1. KSR and the Obviousness Test
A major objection to the SOGRAT patent was tax practitioners' sense
that the patented planning structure-combining nonqualified stock options
with a grantor retained annuity trust-did not represent an innovative
development that competent estate tax planners could not achieve in the
ordinary course of business. 74  In fact, most of the tax bar considers the
SOGRAT structure an example of typical planning activity undertaken by
estate planners in considering possible combinations of the various tax vehicles
available (e.g., partnerships, grantor retained annuity trusts, grantor trusts) with
the various types of assets held by their clients. This is basically an objection
to the Patent Office's inadequate understanding of obviousness in
consideration of patent applications for tax planning methods.
In April 2007, the Supreme Court decided KSR International v. Teleflex,
Inc.,7 a case dealing with the patentability requirement of nonobviousness.
The Court held that a test employed by the Federal Circuit for combining prior
73. Statement of Administration Policy on H.R. 1908, Patent Reform Act of 2007 from the Executive
Office of the President, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, (Sept. 6, 2007), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
legislative/sap/i 10-1/hrl 908sap-r.pdf.
74. Tax Patents: High Court Limits Obviousness, http://ataxingmatter.blogs.comi/tax/2007/05/
tax-patentshig.html (May 1, 2007) ("Practitioners have argued, for example, that the SOGRAT patent, for
which a patent infringement claim was recently settled, should not have been issued--even assuming arguendo
that patents for tax strategies are legitimate-because the patented technique would have been obvious to any
well-versed tax practitioner."). The patent law applies a hypothetical standard, generally referred to as
PHOSITA-a person having ordinary skills in the art. See, e.g., PHOSITA, The Free Dictionary (2007),
http://acronyms.thefreedictionary.com/PHOSITA (defining PHOSITA). Thus, one might think that combining
nonqualified stock options with GRATs after the change in the SEC rules on transferability could have
required an unpredictable creative leap for a small-town practitioner who did not routinely handle estate
planning, but that it would have been a "no-brainer" for most practitioners who specialized in estate tax issues.
75. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
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references-called the "teaching, suggestion, or motivation" test for combining
prior art-was too "rigid": the test provided insight but was inadequate to
determine nonobviousness in the case of a patent claim for attaching a sensor
76to an accelerator pedal. Instead, the Court noted the importance of
recognizing the role of market pressures in pushing inventors to adapt and
combine existing technologies. 
77
As various IP commentators have recognized, the KSR decision
represents an important step for claims in respect of tax strategies by
establishing parameters that "will make it easier to find an invention obvious
and thus unpatentable." 78 Thus, one patent commentator describes the impact
of KSR upon tax-related claims such as the SOGRAT patent in the following
terms:
Before the KSR decision, many courts would have required a specific
statement in either Law #1 [grantor retained annuity trusts] or Law #2
[change in Rule 1 6b-3 permitting transferability of nonqualified stock
options], such as a statement in the legislative history of Law #2 that
the amendment will permit stock options to be transferred to trusts, to
provide a motivation to combine Law #1 and Law #2. Absent such a
statement in the prior art itself, many courts would have ruled that
there was no motivation to combine the references. Under KSR, in
contrast, one might demonstrate a motivation to combine the laws
through literature or testimony demonstrating a market demand to
minimize tax consequences relating to the stock options affected by
the change in Law #2.79
Accordingly, if Patent Office examiners are able to apply KSR's stricter
nonobviousness analysis appropriately, it should have a positive impact on
future assessments of tax-related patent claims. The Patent Office has already
issued new guidelines for determining obviousness in view of KSR,8° but it
remains to be seen whether examiners will be successful in making appropriate
obviousness determinations in tax strategy applications. Under the new
guidelines, examiners should be less willing to find nonobviousness based on a
very narrow concept of, and limited search for, prior art rather than a broad
assessment of existing analogous planning strategies and changes in the market
or interests of clients that could have led ordinary tax planners to develop the
new technique.
2. Comiskey and the Threshold Statutory Subject Matter Requirement
Another judicial development is the Federal Circuit's harder look at the
threshold statutory subject matter requirement for process claims in the In re
Comiskey case, involving a patent application for a process of mandatory
76. Id. at 1741.
77. Id. at 1742.
78. Seidenberg, supra note 57; Nuclear Option, supra note 22, at 24-26.
79. Osborn, supra note 23, at 35.
80. Examination Guidelines for Determining Obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 in View of the Supreme
Court Decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 72 Fed. Reg. 57,256 (Oct. 10, 2007).
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arbitration. 81 James Toupin, General Counsel of the Patent Office, had filed a
supplemental letter brief in Comiskey on behalf of the Patent Office.82  The
brief specifically asked the court to consider the subject matter issue and noted
the Patent Office's concerns that patenting of a marldatory arbitration process
would result in an "invention that depends for utility on positive law, rather
than laws of nature," and therefore may not be patentable subject matter.
83
Although the BPAI had rejected the patent claims on obviousness grounds, the
Federal Circuit went further, holding that at least some of the claims were not
even eligible subject matter. 84 Emphasizing that "[t]he very cases of this court
that recognized the patentability of some business methods have reaffirmed
that abstract ideas are not patentable," the Comiskey court stated that "an
algorithm or abstract idea can state statutory subject matter only if, as
employed in the process, it is embodied in, operates on, transforms, or
otherwise involves another class of statutory subject matter, i.e., a machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter." 85 Thus, Comiskey appears to move
the subject matter doctrine back towards a requirement of some type of
technological intervention, not unlike the earlier "technological arts" test that
had been so roundly rejected in Lundgren.86
Following the September 2007 Comiskey decision and a similar decision
in In re Nuijten that same month that rejected a business method process claim
that appeared to involve only abstract ideas, the Federal Circuit took a further
step that may potentially lead towards at least a partial course reversal on
business method patents. 87 It decided in favor of an en banc rehearing of In re
Bilski, a case involving a process claim for a business method for hedging
energy risk. 88 The BPAI had determined that the Bilski claims were both non-
transformational and merely a "disembodied abstract idea" and therefore non-
patentable. 89  Much of the immediate blog commentary suggested that the
decision represented a tug of war between judges who had won in the
precedential Lundgren decision and the losers in that split decision who were
on the Bilski panel, with the result that the unsettled law was "flipping"
between those positions. 90  The May 8, 2008 Bilski rehearing 91 will directly
81. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
82. Supplemental Letter Brief, In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (No. 2006-1286).
83. Id. at 12.
84. Comiskey, 499 F.3d at 1381.
85. Id. at 1367.
86. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. Gruner suggests, I believe erroneously, that the courts'
move to "disengage" the subject matter requirement from "old notions of technologies or industrial practices"
is an appropriate one that permits the patent law to evolve to suit modem demands. Worlds Collide, supra
note 22, at 44. The trend prior to Comiskey was clearly to broaden subject matter beyond technologically
implemented inventions, however, and that trend may yet resurface, unless the Supreme Court definitively
settles the issue. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
87. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (allowing patenting of a signal encoding
technique for reducing distortion from the introduction of watermarks into audio signals but finding the signal
claim itself not patentable).
88. In re Bilski, No. 2007-1130, Slip Op. at 1 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 15, 2008) (ordering rehearing en banc of
Bilski's energy risk management method following oral argument Oct. 1, 2007).
89. Exparte Bilski, No. 2002-2257 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 2006), at 6, available at www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/dcom/bpai/its/fd022257.pdf.
90. Comments, BPAI 'Informative' Opinion on Business Method Patents, PatentlyO.com,
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address the issue of subject matter eligibility for business method claims. The
rehearing order specifically requests amicus briefing on the issue of whether
the court should overrule State Street.
92
In light of these court decisions, the Patent Office has indicated that it
expects to issue new guidance on the patentability of tax strategy patents. 93
Although no timing has been indicated, it is likely that the Patent Office
guidance will await the release of the Federal Circuit's opinion following the
rehearing in Bilski. It remains unclear whether the guidance will clearly
prohibit patents on business and tax strategies, or merely set out a more
restrictive test for providing such patents.
Accordingly, it is possible that the courts and the Patent Office will soon
effectively ban tax strategy patents through a new understanding of the subject
matter requirement for tax patents. One drawback, of course, is the possibility
for further reversals of position on the issue. Different judges and new
situations could lead the trial courts and Federal Circuit to retreat to a laxer
variant of the State Street position, unless the Supreme Court sets out clear
guidance. 94
Whether this undercurrent of change will be sufficiently vigorous to lead
the Patent Office to refuse to patent tax planning methods that are not
necessarily carried out by computer technology is uncertain. Even if only tax
planning methods with computerized implementation are ultimately patentable,
there are still significant concerns stemming from the ubiquitous role of
computers in ordinary business processes and the potential inability of the
Patent Office examiners to distinguish tax-related applications on the
borderline that are truly technological from those that are not.
95
C. Proposed Reportable Transaction Regulations Governing Patented
Transactions
In 1999, the Federal Circuit also decided another case that casts a long
shadow over the patenting of tax planning strategies. In the now (in)famous
Juicy Whip v. Orange Bang decision, the Federal Circuit held that the utility
threshold requirement is not high, and it is satisfied if there is "some
identifiable benefit. ' '96  Accordingly, the Patent Office does not assess the
utility of patent claims, such as tax planning strategies, in terms of their
usefulness in providing a public benefit or in furthering public policies.
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2007/02/bpaiinformativ.html (Feb. 16, 2007).
91. See Audio Tape: In re Bilski Oral Arguments (May 8,2008), available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.
gov/oralarguments/mp3/2007-1130-2.mp3, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oralarguments/mp3/2007-1130-
3.mp3 (providing digital recordings of the May 8 oral arguments at the CAFC).
92. In re Bilski, No. 2007-1130, Slip Op. at 1.
93. See Alison Bennett, Sowell Expects US. Patent Office to Issue Guidance Curbing Tax Patents,
DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Jan. 23, 2008, at G-8 (stating that Sowell expects guidance to be issued "indicating
that tax strategies that are not associated with technology may not be patented").
94. See Comments, supra note 90 (discussing blog commentary on flip flopping).
95. See Dustin Stamper, IRS Proposes Making Tax Patent Use a Reportable Transaction, 117 Tax
Notes 9 (Oct. 1, 2007) (discussing the need to define the line between strategy and mechanical processes).
96. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364,1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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Rather, it leaves such determinations to other federal agencies that are directly
involved in setting and enforcing those policies. 97  As a result, the Patent
Office can issue patents on devices-such as drag racing cheating devices 
98
-
that may be illegal to use within some jurisdictions. 99
The IRS and the Patent Office thus each operate within their own
jurisdictions to make appropriate determinations. 100 That territoriality creates
a potential for both misperceptions about validity of tax planning patent
claims, as noted by various commentators, 101 and abuse of the patent process
to promote abusive tax shelter transactions. 10
Although tax strategy claims that are designed to further abusive tax
sheltering transactions could receive patent approval, there is no clear evidence
that they have been used, to date, to further abusive tax planning transaction
methods, as the IP bar readily points out. 103 Patent applications are generally
publicized after the initial eighteen-month period, but it is possible for
applications to remain confidential throughout the application review process if
there is no intent to file for similar protection abroad. 104  Thus, there may be
applications in the pipeline that are abusive, but that would not be known at
this point.
The grant of a patent does not assure the licensee of a patented planning
method that the tax consequences of the method as set out in the patent are
correct. The fact that a government agency has approved a patent for the tax-
saving method may, however, be seen by both tax practitioners and taxpayers
as certifying that the patented planning method provides the tax benefits
claimed. This is a particular problem for the tax system, because taxpayers are
obligated to report the tax consequences of each of their transactions and
97. Id. at 1368.
98. Family Software, What You Need to Know About-Electronics and Cheating,
RACINGARTICLES.Com (2000), http://racingarticies.com/artieleracing-ll.html (regarding patent issued in
1991 for computerized device to cheat in drag car races).
99. See also Worlds Collide, supra note 22, at 68 (listing patents on gambling devices, radar detection
devices, cock fighting devices and alcoholic productior, devices issued during prohibition).
100. Compare Toupin Statement, supra note 49 (Patent Office makes its determinations without regard to
validity under tax laws), with Hearing on Issues Relating to the Patenting of Tax Advice Before the Subcomm.
On Select Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. On Ways and Means, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of The
Honorable Mark W. Everson, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service), available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings/asp?formmode-view&id=5104.
101. See, e.g., Charles F. Wieland & Richard S. Marshall, Tax Strategy Patents-Policy and Practical
Considerations, 35 TAX MGM'T MEMO 499 (2006), updated in 35 TAX MGM'T COMP. PLANNING J. 123(2007); AICPA, AIPA Urges Congress to Address Tax Strategy Patents (2007), http://tax.aicpa.org/Resources/
Tax+Patents/AICPA+Urges+Congress+to+Address+Tax+Strategy+Patents.htm; ABA Section of Taxation,
Comments Concerning a New Category of Reportable Transaction Covering Patented Tax Strategies (2007),
available at http://meetings.abanetaarg/webupaad/cammupload/TX8sources/Commentsona
NewCategoryofReportableTransactionsCoveringPatentedTaxStrategies.pdf (supporting treating patented
transactions as a new category of reportable transactions) [hereinafter ABA, Comments].
102. See, e.g., Osborn, supra note 23 (similarly concluding that the patent process may permit patenting
of abusive schemes).
103. Commissioner Everson stated as recently as 2004 that the IRS had not seen an abuse of the patenting
process in its review of patent applications. See Worlds Collide, supra note 22, at 54 n.99 (citing Everson
statement at Ways and Means hearing).
104. Linda M. Beale, Tax Shelters and the Tax Minimization Norm: How Does the Patenting of Tax
Advice Transform the (Global) Playing Field?, J. L. Soc'Y (forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssrn.comj
abstract= 1073152 [hereinafter Beale, Tax Shelters].
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activities in accordance with the tax law. Any perceived government sanction
of an illegal or ineffective method of reporting tax liabilities would have a
strong ability to mislead or confuse taxpayers in carrying out this duty. That is
quite different from an individual citizen's choice to purchase a licensed device
for conducting illegal activities, when they are clearly under no obligation to
take part in such activities. This voluntary compliance aspect of the tax system
and the universal applicability of the tax laws distinguish tax from other areas
of law and make the granting of tax strategy patents especially worrisome.
Furthermore, a required disclaimer for promotions of patented transactions that
the granting of a patent does not confirm that the planning method provides the
tax benefits claimed might not alleviate the confusion caused by the apparent
stamp of governmental approval. Similar disclaimers required under the new
Circular 230 written opinion requirements are appended to so many materials
that tax practitioners question whether they may well be disregarded and
ignored by most readers. 105
The IRS has responded to these additional concerns-both the potential
that taxpayers could be misled by the existence of a patent to consider the
patented strategy necessarily valid and the possibility that tax planning method
patents could be used to promote abusive tax avoidance transactions-by
promulgating proposed regulations that require disclosure for patented
transactions under the IRS's reportable transaction rules. 106  This is an
important step, though one that complicates the reportable transaction regime
and may ultimately create a considerable volume of material that the IRS, with
its currently restricted resources, may be unable to process efficiently. 107
In brief, the reportable transaction regulations were developed over the
last decade as a means of providing greater transparency and more timely
information about tax planning to the IRS, so that it can better assess the
validity of innovative tax planning methods based on aggressive interpretations
of the Code that have a potential for tax avoidance and undertake timely audits
of participating taxpayers. 108 Not every transaction is required to be reported;
instead, the regulations promulgated under Code Section 6011 establish a small
105. DEBORAH L. PAUL & BRYAN C. SKARLATOS, REPORT ON CIRCULAR 230 REGULATIONS, REP. No.
1081, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N TAX SEC. 4 (2005), available at http://www.nysba.org/Content
ContentFolders20/TaxLawSection/TaxReports/1081rpt.pdf.
106. The notice of proposed rulemaking expressed the IRS's concerns about the potential patentability of
tax shelter transactions, the potential to mislead taxpayers about legitimacy of patented transaction strategies,
and the possibility that patenting of tax strategies might impede the efforts of tax administrators to obtain
information about tax shelters at the same time that it could have a negative impact on tax administration.
Patented Transactions, 72 Fed. Reg. 54615 (proposed Sept. 25, 2007) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1 & 301)
[hereinafter, NPRM]; see also Stamper, supra note 95 (describing reaction to the proposal).
107. This is another area in which the IP bar misjudges the importance of the issue. For example, Gruner
states that patent applications can be "easily... analyzed and publicly characterized as abusive" and thus the
impact of patents on sheltering transactions is "illusory." Worlds Collide, supra note 22, at 54. Even with the
improved transparency that the reportable transaction regime has provided, and the enhanced penalty structure,
the IRS must constantly struggle to fight the development of abusive shelters, in part because of the existing
incentives to innovate.
108. See T.D. 9017, 2002-2 C.B. 815 (setting out disclosure requirements); T.D. 9018, 2002-2 C.B. 823
(setting out list maintenance requirements applicable to "material advisors"); T.D. 9046, 2003-1 C.B. 614
(finalizing the reportable transaction regulations); see generally Beale, Before the Return, supra note 11, at
613-17 (discussing the chronology of the statutory and regulatory changes under the anti-tax shelter initiative).
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number of filters to identify for special disclosure those transaction types that
are most likely to involve aggressive tax planning. The filters include listed
transactions, confidential transactions, transactions with contractual protection,
loss transactions, and transactions involving a brief asset holding period.109
Listed transactions are transactions that the IRS has identified as abusive tax
avoidance transactions through notice or other published guidance.'
10
Additional regulations promulgated under Code Sections 6111 and 6112
govern reporting and list maintenance by material advisors.
In 2006, the Treasury Department amended the reportable transaction
regulations and issued proposed and temporary regulations adding a category
of reportable transaction called "transactions of interest."1  In the
commentary on the proposed regulation, the IRS and Treasury Department
noted that tax strategy patents might be interpreted as approval by the
government for the patented transaction and expressed concern that such
patents could impede tax administration. 112 They asked for comments on the
potential creation of a new category of reportable transactions to cover
patented tax strategies. After receiving various comments, including from the
ABA Task Force, 113 suggesting that there be some method of disclosure for
patented tax strategies, the IRS and Treasury Department released a notice of
proposed rulemaking with lproposed regulations treating patented transactions
as reportable transactions.
The proposed regulations with respect to tax strategy patents expand the
categories of transactions that must be reported by adding a category of
"patented transactions" to the reportable transaction filters and by treating most115
patent holders as material advisors. There are two subparts for the definition
of patented transactions that are designed to require disclosure by both patent
users and patent holders or their agents. Thus, patented transactions are
transactions (i) for which a patent user pays a fee for the legal right to use a
patented tax planning method, and (ii) for which a patent holder (or patent
holder's agent) has the right to payment for another person's use of a patented
tax planning method.116  Reporting is triggered by inclusion of a patented
transaction item (including deduction of payments to the Patent Office to apply
for a patent) on a tax return.117
The definition of the critical term, "tax planning method," is quite broad,
but does provide an exemption for tax preparation software:
[T]he term tax planning method means any plan, strategy, technique,
109. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(1) (as amended in 2007).
110. Id. § 1.6011-4(b)(2) (as amended in 2007).
111. Id. § 1.6011-4(b)(6) (as amended in 2007).
112. 71 Fed. Reg. 64,488 (Nov. 2, 2006) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
113. ABA, Comments, supra note 101; see also Alison Bennett, ABA Tax Section Says IRS Should
Require Reporting of Transactions Using Tax Patents, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), No.3 5, at G-5 (Feb. 22, 2007)
(discussing the ABA Task Force comments).
114. NPRM, supra note 106.
115. Prop. Treas. Reg. §1.6011-4(b)(7), 72 Fed. Reg. 54,617 (Sept. 26, 2007).
116. Id. § 1.6011-4(b)(7)(i).
117. Id. § 1.6011-4(c)(3)(i)(F).
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or structure designed to affect Federal income, estate, gift, generation
skipping transfer, employment, or excise taxes. A patent issued solely
for tax preparation software or other tools used to perform or model
mathematical calculations or to provide mechanical assistance in the
preparation of tax or information returns is not a tax planning
method. 118
For patent users, the definition of patented transactions requires
knowledge or reason to know that the planning method is the subject of a
patent. IN  Fees include any form of consideration, but do not include
settlement of, or payment of damages in, an infringement suit. l12 Thus,
persons from whom the IRS could not be expected to receive valuable
information in a timely fashion, such as a person who uses a patented tax
strategy without knowing about the patent or an infringer, are not subject to the
disclosure requirement.
The ABA Task Force has commented on the proposed regulations, noting
the importance of requiring reporting at the time of application for tax strategy
patents as a means of allowing tax administrators a timely opportunity to
assess covered transactions and determine whether some further action, either
within the agency or in Congress, is necessary. 121 For example, a tax method
claim for which a patent is sought may be clearly erroneous as a matter of law
under existing authorities. In that case, the IRS could perhaps issue a notice or
some other published guidance that describes the components of the
transaction and sets out the settled interpretation of the law under which the
patent claims fail. If the IRS can issue such guidance expeditiously, such a
notice should not be viewed by the Patent Office as irrelevant merely because
it is issued after the patent application is made available to the IRS. The IRS's
statements of settled law, demonstrating that the tax planning method does not
achieve the claimed tax benefits, should guide the Patent Office in its
understanding of the prior art relevant to the patent claim and permit the Patent
Office to reject the application on the basis of lack of utility.
Patent claims that present non-novel or obvious extensions of current law
that would have been accessible to ordinary tax practitioners may also present
an opportunity for the IRS to assist the Patent Office in deciphering prior art.
Attorneys within the Office of Chief Counsel could review such applications
and submit prior art references to the Patent Office. Those references, again,
should lead the Patent Office to conclude that persons having ordinary skill in
the art could have developed the tax planning method presented in the patent
claim and thus to reject the patent application.
As the IP bar has suggested, if a tax method claim in a patent application
is abusive, the IRS could issue a notice identifying the tax planning technique
118. Id. § 1.6011-4(b)(7)(ii)(F).
119. Id. § 1.6011-4(b)(7)(i).
120. Id. § 1.6011-4(b)(7)(ii)(A).
121. ABA SEC. OF TAXATION, COMMENTS CONCERNING PROPOSED REGULATIONS UNDER SECTIONS 6011
AND 6111 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE RELATING TO PATENTED TRANSACTIONS 6 (2008), available at
http://www.abanet.org/tax/pubpolicy/2008/080129proposedregulationsundersection6011 and6 111 relatingtopate
ntedtransactions.pdf [hereinafter, ABA PROPOSED REG., COMMENTS].
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as a listed transaction, thus alerting taxpayers and tax advisors that the IRS
does not consider the method a valid interpretation of the tax laws.'
22
Although the listing process generally takes some time and each potential
listed transaction requires extensive review within the IRS, that process is
considerably more responsive than legislative changes, which often require
several congressional terms to achieve.123 The listing process should
eventually provide a means of discouraging use of an abusive method patent.
Practitioners are wary of recommending listed transactions to their clients, so
that merely requiring reporting with respect to a transaction structure has been
successful in discouraging its use. 124 It is therefore likely that the IRS's notice
listing a patented transaction as abusive would discourage taxpayers from
participating in the transaction if a patent were granted and would similarly
discourage promoters from developing similar transactions.
To facilitate discovery of abusive transactions, the reportable transaction
regulations already require reporting of confidential transactions, as noted
above. Those rules may be avoided by taxpayers and advisers intending to
take their chances with the audit lottery, however, by eliminating any
contractual requirements for confidentiality while maintaining confidentiality
"in fact."'125  Patents could also facilitate promoters in maintaining secrecy
about the use of a tax strategy. Although the patent would be published upon
issuance, there is no patent provision requiring disclosure of licensing
agreements. 126 Required reporting by licensed users of patented transactions
and by patent holders as material advisors under the proposed reportable
transaction regulations will therefore more likely ensure that potentially
abusive transactions are disclosed to the IRS and bring full scrutiny to those
who use such transactions.
Several commentators have objected to the reportable transaction
mechanism as too burdensome for patent holders and licensees and have urged
122. See, e.g., Worlds Collide, supra note 22, at 58 (discussing changes in tax regulations).
123. If additional action by the IRS or Congress is necessary beyond a listing notice, it may be difficult to
take necessary steps in a timely fashion. The IP bar tends to misunderstand the nature of the legislative
process for tax changes. See, e.g., Nuclear Option, supra note 22, at 27 ("The IRS does not need to infringe
the patent to destroy its value-it can adopt regulations making use of the strategy unacceptably risky or it can
lobby Congress to amend the tax statute to make the strategy unworkable."). Regulatory projects are subject to
extraordinarily long delays, and Congressional action is subject to delays as well as the vagaries of the politicalprocess, providing no assurance that changes can be put into effect as needed. In addition, a change to one
area of the Code or regulations inevitably has implications for other areas and cannot be undertaken without
understanding those consequences. Thus, even for abusive transactions it could take years before a legislative
or regulatory remedy could be enacted. Nonabusive transactions offer an even more difficult scenario for
remedy, since the problem is the issuance of the patent itself, not the tax law provisions. See infra Part IV.B
for further discussion of this issue.
124. Stamper, supra note 95, at 10 (reporting ABA task force chair Dennis Drapkin's comment that -just
the act of making a transaction reportable has often affected its use.").
125. Robert A. Rizzi, Tax Shelters Invade: Corporate Transactions and the Anti-Shelter Crusade, CoRP.
TAX'N, July-Aug. 2004, at 23 (suggesting one response to required disclosure of confidential transactions is to
execute transactions with documents that disclaim any confidentiality requirement but that "remain
confidential in fact").
126. See Diane Freda, Attorneys Advised Tax Strategy Patents Nothing New, DAILY TAX Rap. (BNA),
Nov. 2, 2006, at G-12 (noting statement by Georgetown professor Jay Thomas that tax attorneys say they use
patents "so they don't have to make it confidential").
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that the IRS defer to congressional action instead. 127 Similar objections were
voiced when the IRS first proposed the reportable transaction regulations for
other types of transactions, 128 yet that regime has been in operation for some
time without the strong negative repercussions that critics projected. The
reportable transaction regime permits a speedier response to abusive
transactions than would otherwise be available. Without the regulations, the
IRS would not learn about abusive patented transactions until the patent issued.
Some issued patents for tax shelter transactions might avoid close scrutiny by
the IRS due to their classification or manner of stating claims or other
means. 129 Even for those that the IRS does scrutinize, the IRS would require
some time to assess fully the patented transaction, and in that time transactions
would have the opportunity to go forward. The IRS could also develop
legislative proposals to address abuses that exploit a perceived loophole in the
current tax provisions, but there would likely be a considerable time lag before
Congress could or would take action. A particular tax shelter is typically
undertaken by relatively few taxpayers only in the period before the tax
administration becomes aware of it, so delayed Congressional action to
obsolete the transaction would not provide a sufficient hurdle. Thus, a patent
on a tax shelter transaction would likely have considerably more value if there
is not some mechanism such as the reportable transaction regulations to
provide information to the IRS at the time of the patent application.
If the proposed regulations are finalized substantially in their current
form, they will provide an important tool in the arsenal of the tax
administration to deal with tax shelter transactions. It would be difficult to
exploit the patenting process to avoid the restraints on confidential tax advice
that promotes abusive transactions. The additional transparency provided by
requiring reporting to the IRS by the patent applicant at the time of fee
payments in connection with the patent application should give tax
administrators a timely opportunity to evaluate the validity of the transaction
under current interpretations of the tax laws. 130 That evaluation could result in
listing the transaction set forth in the underlying patent claims and thus act as a
significant deterrent to use of the abusive transaction method. 131
The reportable transaction regulations will not, however, resolve all of the
127. See, e.g., Internal Revenue Service, Unofficial Transcript of IRS Hearing on Patented Transactions
is Available, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 21, 2008, LEXIS, 2008 TNT 41-26 (hereinafter IRS Hearing].
128. E.g., Warren Rojas & Sheryl Stratton, Tax Shelter Regs. Too Burdensome, Practitioners Tell
Government, 97 TAX NOTES 1509, Dec. 19, 2002; Michael Fleming, Leasing Group Expresses Concern over
Tax Shelter Reporting Regs., 2002 TAX NOTES TODAY 249-15, Nov. 27, 2002; Douglas J. Antonio, Bar Panel
Criticizes Corporate Tax Shelter Regs., 2000 TAX NOTES TODAY 102-27, May 17, 2000.
129. See Allison & Tiller, supra note 39, at 1021 (noting the possibility that many applications are
presented in ways to avoid classification as business method patents in order to avoid the second review
required for such patent applications).
130. The Texas tax bar noted, however, that a patent applicant could decide not to deduct the fee
payments and thus avoid reporting on the technicality of not having a deduction. See IRS Hearing, supra note
127 (statement of Kevin Thomason). The IRS will likely amend the proposed regulations to address this issue,
perhaps by requiring reporting at any time that a taxpayer is eligible to take a deduction related to a patented
transaction on a return.
131. The IRS's listing of a transaction does not make it an illegal position to take on a tax return, and
taxpayers remain able to litigate any assessment of tax liability in court.
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concerns of the tax bar and tax administration with the issuance of patents for
tax strategies. 132 A number of difficult issues remain, in particular for those
patented transactions that would not result in identification as listed
transactions. These issues are addressed in Part IV.
IV. WHY TAX STRATEGY PATENTS MATTER
A patent is a grant of a monopoly in the patented technology for the life
of the patent.' 33 Benefits from holding a patent therefore include the ability to
charge a fee or royalty for others to use the patented technology or, if the
holder chooses, the ability to exclude others from using the technology
covered. If a tax strategy patent is valid, taxpayers who do not arrange a
license with the patent holder (and pay the related royalty) to use the tax-
structuring technique covered by the claims of the patent would face the
possibility of a patent infringement suit (assuming their use of the patented
method becomes known to the patent holder). 134 Even if a tax strategy patent
is not valid and could be overturned through litigation, many or even most
taxpayers will likely not be able to engage in the patented tax-structuring
technique without paying a royalty, because of the high costs of challenging a
patent once it has been granted by the Patent Office. 135 A patent provides
these exclusionary rights for twenty years from the date of filing.
136
This Part restates the primary objections to tax strategy patents granting
these exclusionary rights if, in spite of the hopeful signs outlined in the prior
Parts, tax strategy patents continue to be issued. The intent is to provide a
better grounding of the rationales, which have been addressed by a number of
tax commentators, in the foundational principles of the tax system and the
institutional role of tax in our democracy. Part IV.A considers the impact of
these exclusionary rights in the case of patented tax claims that provide a
strategy for an abusive tax shelter transaction. Part IV.B addresses their
impact in the case of legitimate tax planning strategies.
A. Patenting ofAbusive Tax Planning Strategies
The ability of any person to receive royalties for licensing use of a patent
on an abusive tax avoidance strategy would be particularly offensive. To the
extent that such patents avoided the IRS's scrutiny and were successfully
132. See, e.g., Bennett, IRS Remains Concerned, supra note 4, at G-2.
133. If a patent issues, the patent holder obtains the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, or
offering to sell or importing the patented invention. 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(1), 271(a) (2000).
134. Id. §281.
135. Litigating patents is expensive. See, e.g., William A. Drennan, The Patented Loophole: How Should
Congress Respond to this Judicial Invention? 59 FLA. L. REV. 229, 293 (2007) ("Based on a survey of
intellectual property lawyers in 2000, the cost of defending a... case[] with less than $1 million at risk...
was $300,000 to $750,000 or about half the amount in dispute."); WENDY R. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS,
PATENT REFORM: INNOVATION ISSUES, 7 (2007) (noting average costs of patent enforcement as high as $1.2
million, with higher stakes litigation costing as much as $4 million to each party).
136. The maximum term is ordinarily twenty years from the date the patent application is filed. 35
U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
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promoted to select groups of users, the Patent Office would have become an
enabler of promoters of tax shelters, at the same time that the IRS continues to
expend considerable resources in fighting such shelter promotions. 137  The
IRS's reportable transaction rules have provided greater transparency to make
it harder to profit from tax shelters, and Congress's recent strengthening of
penalty provisions has encouraged greater compliance. 138 Although the IRS is
still hindered by insufficient resources for enforcement, it has made enforcing
its tax shelter rules a priority. Anecdotal reports suggest that the anti-tax
shelter focus has gained some traction in the struggle against the shelter
industry as tax chiefs atpublic corporations are paying attention and avoiding
tax shelter promotions. 139 Congress has continued the trend by changing the
tax return preparer provision to force tax advisers to balance their tax
minimization planning with a proper regard for the integrity of the tax laws,
requiring a confidence level of more likely than not for tax return preparers'
work. 1W
Patenting tax shelter strategies is fundamentally inconsistent with this
effort to squelch tax shelter promotion. If patent applications are not available
for review by the IRS (either through the reportable transaction regime or some
other mechanism for opening applications for IRS review), shelter promoters
could develop new shelter transactions and apply for patents, without
publishing the application (to avoid IRS scrutiny). Assuming a patent issued,
the holder could reap substantial economic benefits from the promotional value
of the patent, prior to any action by the IRS to list or challenge the transaction.
Consider, for example, the various provisions enacted by Congress to end
inappropriate deductions for equity-like returns that are legally in the form of
interest on debt.' 4  An inventive investment banker may create a new financial
derivative product that applies a hyper-literal interpretation to the Code to
claim success in again characterizing an equity-like payment as interest
eligible for an interest deduction. The IRS's determinations regarding claimed
tax benefits of derivatives historically require considerable time and internal
review. The patent holder might well reap substantial profits before the IRS
determines that the product is not taxable as claimed. Even if those deals can
be challenged through audits and litigation, the anti-shelter enforcement drive
suffers and, with it, the federal fisc.
137. See generally Linda M. Beale, Putting SEC Heat on Audit Firms and Corporate Tax Shelters:
Responding to Tax Risk with Sunshine, Shame and Strict Liability, 29 J. CORP. L. 219 (2004) (discussing the
interrelated problems of financial accounting fraud and corporate tax shelters and the effort by the IRS to
address the issues).
138. Id. at 221.
139. See generally id. at 239-40 (relating legal, accounting, and other costs associated with defending tax
strategies against "disgruntled taxpayers, shareholders, and the IRS").
140. Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-28, § 8246(b), 203, 121
Stat. 190 (2007) (revising the confidence level required to avoid penalties under Code § 6694 from realistic
possibility of success to more likely than not). The author proposed this change in an earlier article on ethical
responsibilities of tax advisers. Beale, Before the Return, supra note 11, at 638-44.
141. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 163(e)(5) (2007) (high yield discount obligation rules); I.R.C. § 163(1) (2007)
(equity-linked debt rules).
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B. Patenting of Legitimate Tax Planning Strategies
Tax practitioner concerns with tax strategy patents extend over a range of
issues that have been addressed repeatedly in a number of published articles
and commentary. 142 This article will not reiterate all of the many arguments
that have been made. It will, rather, focus on several broad points. As a
threshold matter, the tax bar concern that the Patent Office is not equipped to
apply the nonobviousness standards and other patentability requirements to
sophisticated tax transactions is not an insubstantial concern that can be lightly
dismissed. The Patent Office has not hired, and will not be able to hire,
sufficient tax attorneys with the breadth and depth of expertise necessary to
assess sophisticated tax planning techniques. Also, the tax bar is concerned
about a variety of interrelated problems that are encompassed within the
concept of private appropriation of the tax laws. These problems rest in the
fundamental conflict between the tax law's goal of collecting revenues through
a voluntary compliance system that depends on a system of laws that fairly
demand sacrifice of the nation's residents to fund important governmental
goals and the patent law's goal of providing temporary monopolies to private
parties to incentivize beneficial innovations. Three particular manifestations of
this fundamental conflict are addressed here: fairness issues, institutional
concerns, and professional concerns.
1. Patent Office Competence to Assess Tax Strategies
Even if abusive transactions can be addressed through means such as the
reportable transaction regulations, there remain substantial concerns about the
competence of patent examiners-who are frequently scientists and engineers
or, at best, economists or business specialists by training-to make appropriate
patent eligibility determinations in the case of tax planning method patents. 
143
The IP bar tends to understate these concerns and express unbounded optimism
in the Patent Office's ability to adapt to this new challenge. 144 The tax bar is
142. E.g., Ellen Aprill, Responding to Tax Strategy Patents, USC TAX INSTITUTE-MAJOR TAX
PLANNING (forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=980347; Beale, supra note 104; Dennis I.
Belcher & Dana G. Fitzsimons, Tax Planners-Beware of Patented Estate Planning Techniques, PROBATE &
PROPERTY, Nov./Dec. 2006, at 24, available at http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/TX800000/
newsletterpubs/BelcherRPPTmagazinearticle.pdf; Bubb, supra note 56; Paul Devinsky, John Fuisz & Thomas
Sykes, Whose Tax Law Is It? Alarm Bells Should Ring over Risking Efforts to Patent Tax Strategies, LEGAL
TIMES IP MAG., Oct. 16, 2006, at S12; David A. Weisbach, Disrupting the Market for Tax Planning, 26 VA.
TAX REV. 971 (2007); Wieland & Marshall, supra note 101; Letter from Kevin Thomason, Chair Section of
Taxation for State Bar of Texas, to members of Congress (Sept. 14, 2007), available at
http://www.texastaxsection.org/letter2007.pdf; Jack Cathey, Howard Godfrey & Justin Ransome, Tax Patents
Considered, 204 J. OF ACCOUNTANCY 40 (2007); Drennan, supra note 135; Andrew A. Schwartz, The Patent
Office Meets the Poison Pill: Why Legal Methods Cannot Be Patented, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 333 (2007);
Brant J. Hellwig, Questioning the Wisdom of Patent Protection for Tax Planning, 26 VA. TAX REV. 1005
(2007), Alan S. Lederman, Tax-Related Patents: A Novel Incentive or an Obvious Mistake?, 105 J. TAX'N 325
(2006).
143. See Beata Gocyk-Farber, Note, Patenting Medial Procedures. A Search for a Compromise Between
Ethics and Economics, 18 CARDOZO L. Rev. 1527, 1561 n.254 (1997) (noting that patent examiners are
usually experts in the field).
144. See Nuclear Option, supra note 22, at 4-5 (expressing optimism about the Patent Office's ability to
deal with new fields).
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considerably less optimistic. 145 Sophisticated applications of tax law may be
present in tax-related patent claims with respect to exotic financial derivatives
or similar planning strategies. Engineers' ability to expand their repertoire to
cover the data processing aspects of financial transactions and software bears
little relation to the need for the Patent Office to acquire sufficient tax expertise
to assess tax planning methods. Fields like banking, real estate analysis, sales,
and business consulting simply do not have a foundational legal system as
immense or as challenging as the Code and regulations and other authorities
applicable to tax planning. Many tax partners in firms deal primarily with one
or another area of the tax code-partnerships or corporations or trusts or
financial products or individual taxation issues. It is challenging to acquire
that in-depth expertise across all fields and generally requires years of
experience, constant exposure to new transactions, and continuing education
on relevant statutory and administrative authority changes. Consider the
divisions within the IRS itself, where some deal with financial products, others
with corporate tax, and still others with partnerships and other tax conduits. 146
Furthermore, practitioners that leave commercial practice to become
academics, journalists or government officials face further difficulties. It is
difficult, if not impossible, for them to stay in touch with current transactions
and the new, aggressive techniques being developed, particularly with each of
the many changes in the tax law, unless they also maintain a practice that
continues to expose them to new developments. 147 Simply hiring a few patent
examiners with backgrounds in tax, or holding special training sessions or
presentations for those examiners, as suggested by the IP bar, 14  will not
suffice; nonetheless, the Patent Office has in the past asserted that they
consider themselves already competent to assess tax strategies. 149 This is an
145. See Floyd Norris, Patent Law is Getting Tax Crazy, INT'L TIMES HERALD, Oct. 10, 2006, at 12
(expressing concern over patent attorneys' tax expertise).
146. The IRS's Office of Chief Counsel is divided into six associate chief counsel offices corresponding
to primary areas of tax technical expertise: international, corporate, pass-throughs and special industries,
income tax and accounting, procedure and administration, and financial institutions and products; in addition,
it includes experts in criminal tax as well as tax-exempt and government entities. B. John Williams, Jr., The
Office of Chief Counsel: A Renewed Commitment to Guidance, THE TAX EXECUTIVE, Mar. - Apr. 2002
available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/nitm6552/is_2_54/ai_86472900. An attorney in the Office of
Chief Counsel who specializes in financial institutions and products would be expected to know the tax laws
relating to banks, thrift institutions, investment companies, insurance companies, real estate investment trusts,
and similar institutions, as well as the tax laws governing the tax treatment of financial products, credit default
swaps, contingent payment debt instruments, and various exotic derivatives. See, e.g., Press Release, IRS,
Stephen Larson Named Acting Associate Chief Counsel (Aug. 22, 2007) (describing the tax matters covered
by that Associate Chief Counsel office).
147. This is openly acknowledged by tax practitioners.
148. See, e.g., Worlds Collide, supra note 22, at 66 (suggesting that cooperation, presentations and
submissions of prior art can resolve the problem).
149. See, e.g., Alison Bennett, Patent Office Staying Out of Debate over Tax Strategy Patent, Official
Says, 74 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 498 (Aug. 24, 2007) (noting comment by Patent Office
official Wynn Coggins that she expected tax patents to continue to issue based on the novelty test, and that her
office has "great expertise" in the area). The question of the competence of the Patent Office examiners to
deal with the intricate complexities of the tax law is dealt with in some detail in an earlier article. See
generally Beale, Tax Shelters, supra note 104. Note that patent lawyers also have some concern about the
ability of the Patent Office to apply the law as developed in KSR or other cases appropriately. See, e.g.,
Comments, supra note 90 (noting concern about patent examiners' ability to apply any new nonobviousness
standard set by the KSR Court in blog commentary on Bilski BPAI decision).
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area frequently misunderstood by the IP bar, members of which tend to assume
that the lack of an adequate database can be remedied as easily it has been for
very different categories like software, by simply' encouraging more
submissions of prior art or other relatively simple 
steps.
Finally, it may be especially difficult for Patent Office examiners to
determine whether a particular tax-related claim merely implements statutory
objectives (and therefore is obvious) or rather creatively extends the statutory
provision to a novel structure that could only be understood to be
comprehended within the statutory scope in hindsight. I have argued that the
tax laws require a coherence-reinforcing interpretive approach that attempts to
fit each provision into a structurally coherent system, to the extent possible and
consistent with the purpose for the particular provision. 151  This coherence-
reinforcing interpretation is necessary to understand the capacity of the Code
for governing new transaction structures that have not been explicitly
considered during enactment. For example, some statutory provisions may
apply only to very specific types of transactions. To take a simple case, the
reorganization provision in Section 368(a)(1)(A) applies only to
reorganizations that are effectuated under a valid merger or consolidation
statute. An extraordinary amount of discussion has taken place over the years
since the enactment of the provision to determine what mergers are actually
covered by the provision.' Multistep transactions may be integrated and
recast as "A" reorganizations. The tax bar and IRS continue to discuss these
issues, so it is clear that the Patent Office would struggle to make obviousness
determinations about these complex transaction structures.
2. Private Monopolies on Interpretations of the Tax Laws
In its comments on the proposed patented transaction regulations, the
ABA Task Force expressed its concern about the potential for tax strategy
patents to effectively privatize provisions of the tax law by permitting the
holder to exercise monopoly control over a legal interpretation as it applies to a
novel financial transaction or structure. 153 The proposed regulations may
150. See, e.g., Richard S. Gruner, In Search of the Undiscovered Country: The Challenge of Describing
Patentable Subject Matter, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 395, 434 (2007) (asserting that
temporary database shortages should not limit patentable subject matter); Osbom, supra note 23, at 41-42
(similar). Osbom also argues, contrary to my argument here, that patenting tax planning methods will benefit
the profession by creating pressures to create databases of prior art accessible to Patent Office examiners, thus
expanding information available to tax professionals. Id., at 43-44.
151. See, e.g., Linda M. Beale, Book-Tax Conformity and the Corporate Tax Shelter Debate: Assessing
the Proposed Section 475 Mark-to-Market Safe Harbor, 24 VA. TAX REv. 301, 359-70 (2004) (discussing the
importance of coherence-reinforcing interpretations considering the tax system as a whole and the purpose for
particular provisions in light of discoverable overarching principles); Beale, Before the Return, supra note 11,
at 590-91, 590 n. 17 (discussing the endogenous principle of structural coherence and self-assessment).
152. See generally Steven A. Bank, A Transcontinental "A" Train? Foreign Mergers under Section
368(a)(1)(A), TAX LAW. 555 (2001) (discussing mergers); Randy A. Schwartzman, Expansion of Merger and
Consolidation Provisions, CPA J. (June 2005), http://www.nyssepa.org/cpajoumal/2005/605/essentials/
p58.htp (same).
153. ABA PROPOSED REG., COMMENTS, supra note 121, at 5.
In our view, the principal benefit of tax patent reporting is that it will permit the IRS and the
Treasury Department to identify the areas of the tax law for which patents are being claimed-and
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provide notice to the IRS that a patented tax strategy may effectively privatize
an area of the tax law's application; however, it is not clear how the IRS could
respond to remedy the situation since it is endemic to the nature of the
monopoly right granted by the issuance of a patent.
IP commentators argue that privatization of the tax laws on such a broad
scale is not possible, "because the prior art embodied in the law itself
(including the draft legislation) would either anticipate or render obvious all or
most of the explicitly intended applications of the law" or that "patenting one
method will not preclude other strategies involving the same assets or
vehicles." 154 The problem is that while a number of strategies may have been
foreseen when a statute was enacted and specifically contemplated by the
drafters, the statute also clearly should be considered, from a coherence-
reinforcing interpretive perspective, as intended to govern wholly new types of
transactions that nonetheless come within its bounds. Are all of those
"obvious" even though the development of a particular viable structure
requires considerable work by investment bankers and tax planners and
analysis by tax attorneys? I suspect that most tax lawyers would agree that
some structures that do indeed implement statutory objectives are not obvious,
even within the more rigorous KSR standard for obviousness. Thus, the
SOGRAT strategy appeared obvious to most tax practitioners because it
required only a simple extension of a known tax vehicle (the trust) and a
known type of assets (stock options). The creation of guaranteed maturity
classes for REMICs was not obvious, however, because it required a
considerable stretch in application of the relevant rules (regarding the meaning
of credit enhacement contracts and the contexts for permissible purchases of
mortgage loans out of a REMIC vehicle) to accelerate payment to a specific
date not determined by the maturity dates of the purchased mortgage loans.
The ability to design such structures is the hallmark of an exceptional tax guru.
Those innovations that fit within this group, though difficult to identify, would
likely be considered a patentable "invention."
Recognition of the special attributes of the tax system argues against
granting patents to inventors of tax reduction strategies who may either restrict
or capture an interpretation regarding the applicability of a particular area of
the law. The tax system exists to raise revenues appropriately from all citizens
and residents to fund important government functions. To accomplish that
purpose, the tax system requires compliance under a self-assessment system
thus the areas of the tax law that private parties are asserting the right to control. Only if the IRS
and Treasury Department have this information available can they consider the impact of such
claims, both individually and in the aggregate, and formulate whatever responses may appear to be
necessary and appropriate to ensure the proper functioning of our tax laws.
Id.
154. Osbom, supra note 23, at 47. Elsewhere, Osbom refers to tax fears of preemption as a "straw man"
argument. Id. at 49. Interestingly, in spite of the IP bar's devotion to a broad patent law with no exclusions, at
least one IP commentator has proposed that neither the IRS nor the Congress should have the right to take
away the benefit gained by a tax patent once a patent application using that benefit has been filed: the
sugge_ tion is that any legislation passed after the application is published should not be allowed to affect that
patent. See Wagner, supra note 65 (memorandum objecting to proposed Senate bill). This proposal carries
patent preemption of tax legislation to an obviously untenable extreme. Id.
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that is often referred to as voluntary compliance: taxpayers report their tax
items, determine their own tax liabilities and make payment to the government
in accordance with that determination, subject to the possibility of an audit by
tax administrators. 55  The tax system is universal, in that each and every
taxpayer is required to determine their tax liabilities in accordance with all of
the tax provisions that apply to the ordinary business, investment, and personal
endeavors that the taxpayer has undertaken. Because it is a centrally important
function of a democratic government, the tax system is grounded in fairness
norms, including the ideal that taxpayers perceive the system as treating them
fairly in comparison with other taxpayers (often referred to as a "horizontal
equality" mandate that each taxpayer be treated the same as other taxpayers
that are similarly situated). 156  The tax laws are enacted by Congress in
complex packages, including various measures intended to act efficiently to
stimulate activities in some areas or to discourage particular kinds of activities
in other areas. These characteristics of the tax system are all interrelated. A
taxpayer may be less compliant than otherwise expected because of perceived
unfairness or may not report in accordance with the tax laws because of
misunderstood opportunities for avoiding taxation.
The tax system also is the major tool available to Congress to shape and
guide the economy. The tax laws affect taxpayer choices about lifestyles,
careers, and investments. These public-oriented characteristics of the tax
system are at the bottom of the worry about tax strategy patents that is summed
up in the statement that tax patents "improperly grant[] private persons
ownership of the public tax laws."' 157 Privatizing portions of the tax law
weakens the usefulness of tax for accomplishing policy goals.
a. The Innovation Fallacy
Because of the requirement that everyone comply with the tax laws, this
issue tends to be described by the IP bar as a failure of the tax bar to
understand the way patented inventions serve the public good by providing a
suitable means to comply with legal requirements. This is an expression of
what I call the "innovation fallacy" of the IP approach to patenting of legal
strategies. If there is a private monopoly of the tax law, IP commentators say,
it is necessarily fair because the benefit of innovation is the purpose of the
patent law. 1
59
An example of the way that the patent law's encouragement of innovation
works to further legal goals provides an instructive contrast with the tax laws.
155. See Beale, Before the Return, supra note 11, at 607-12 (discussing infrequency of audits and
resulting audit lottery problem that has exacerbated the tax shelter phenomenon).
156. See Sales & Use Tax Review Commission, http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/taxation/
index.html?s-ucommish/comish.htm-mainFrame (last visited Aug. 10, 2008) (providing definition of
"horizontal equity").
157. Dana G. Fitzsimons, Jr., The Rise and (with Hope) Fall of the Tax Strategy Patent, ABA TRUST &
INVS. 34, at 34, Jan.-Feb. 2008.
158. See Osborn, supra note 23, at 47.
159. Id.
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Consider the fact that some jurisdictions require all motorcycle riders to wear
appropriate protective headgear. 160 As IP commentators point out, the fact that
headgear is required to comply with the law does not support prohibition of
patents on motorcycle helmets. 161 To the contrary, a patent on a new type of
motorcycle helmet that is more protective than earlier types saves lives and
allows those who purchase that patented invention to enjoy a new level of
protection. Everyone is better off, even those who cannot afford the
protection. Patent protection incentivized the discovery of a better helmet by
encouraging researchers to spend more than they might otherwise have spent to
develop the new protection. Once the patent expires, the new protection
should be available to all without the added licensing cost. And because the
patent is published, smart inventors will be able to use that discovery as a
springboard to other discoveries. Even those who do not want to pay the
royalty to use the invention are not unable to comply with the law-they are
free to find another means of complying.
The tax bar, on the other hand, finds the IP perspective off base because
the public good is not served by patenting tax avoidance. The law in the
example relates to a choice that someone may or may not make-to ride a
motorcycle. The public through its representatives has decided that the activity
is sufficiently dangerous for participants to require certain protections.
Everything that encourages the development of better protection, including
patent protection for inventors, reinforces the underlying purpose of the law by
providing better means of complying to ensure that the law's protective
purpose is satisfied. Similar arguments apply in the case of patents on
pollution control devices on smokestacks, which reinforce environmental laws
even though they may initially prevent some from carrying out their
manufacturing objectives if they cannot afford the appropriate devices.
In contrast, the complex and extensive tax laws include a limited
affirmative mandate-that taxpayers report their taxable items appropriately,
within the limits of the procedural requirements and confidence levels, and pay
the corresponding tax liabilities. This is discussed extensively in an earlier
article, as follows.
[U]nlike other legal regimes, tax is a set of rules that characterize the
results of taxpayer transactions for purposes of determining
appropriate assessment. It is not a set of prohibitory rules that are
intended to ensure that a person's transactions stay on the legal side of
a fixed line between legal and illegal conduct. Other legal regimes set
out strict requirements that regulated entities must follow to avoid
sanction for committing a proscribed act (such as insider trading under
the securities laws) or for failing appropriately to implement a
required act (such as maintenance of reserve funds for banking
160. Insurance Inst. for Highway Safety, Current U.S. Motorcycle and Bicycle Helmet Laws, Apr. 2008,
http://www.iihs.org/laws/HelmetUseCurrent.aspx.
161. See, e.g., Worlds Collide, supra note 22, at 70 (judging that the tax bar has a "'misplaced" concern
about the capture of legal compliance methods, and comparing tax strategies to pollution control devices that
are widely useful because they are needed to comply with environmental laws and are permitted to be patented
to encourage innovations).
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institutions or appropriate sanitation in hospital operating rooms). For
these regimes, violators are subject to punishment.... In contrast, the
Code neither proscribes nor mandates that taxpayers conduct their
activities by means of particular transactions .... The choice as to
mode of arranging affairs is the taxpayer's business, but the decision
as to how those arrangements will be taxed is the government's
business. Congress has legislated rules that are intended to be
adequate to the taxpayer's self-assessment task of determining the tax
consequences adhering to actions undertaken for non-Code reasons.
There are only two coercive elements in the Code enforced through
the audit process and penalty sanctions - tax reporting and tax
payments.... This [is a] regime of rules that characterize and assess
rather than label and punish.
The tax law applies to everyone and every-wealth producing activity. The
tax system has hundreds of provisions that are intended to ensure that
taxpayers can determine their tax obligations appropriately, whatever activities
they undertake. The tax laws do not require taxpayers to undertake any
particular transaction or deny taxpayers the right to undertake tax-
disadvantaged transactions. Thus, the patenting of tax preparation software to
help individuals report their tax liabilities is the best analogy for the tax regime
to the role of motorcycle helmets in respect of a headgear law because such
software smoothes the way for complying with taxpayers' reporting and
payment obligations.
In contrast, tax planning is an attempt to develop a means of achieving a
particular business or financial transaction in a way that will result in the least
taxes possible, without claiming a tax benefit that is not allowable under the
tax laws that apply to the transaction. Tax planning is neither good nor bad in
itself, but the tax bar is under considerable market pressure from clients to
push tax planning beyond its reasonable boundaries, creating an aggressive
approach to tax planning that I have addressed extensively in prior articles-
the "tax minimization norm"-which is appropriately discouraged by tax
administrators. 63 In brief, the tax minimization approach to the tax adviser's
role is not illegal, as the oft-quoted phrase from Learned Hand makes clear, 164
but the tax minimization norm does not further the underlying purpose of the
tax laws to provide revenues for the federal fisc. Market demands press
lawyers towards more aggressive tax planning methods, leading them to adopt
hyper-literal interpretations of particular Code provisions or to twist the
interpretation of Code provisions to yield the needed outcome, literally
"finding (or manufacturing) loopholes." ' The result is often the grafting of
162. Beale, Before the Return, supra note 11, at 646-47 (citing Richard Lavoie, Making a List and
Checkinglit Twice: Must Tax Attorneys Divulge Who's Naughty and Nice?, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 141,
196-97 (2004)).
163. See id. at 597-607 (discussing the basis for discouraging the tax minimization norm, even while
accepting the legitimacy of tax planning within the context of particular clients' planned transactions).
164. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
165. B. John Williams, Jr., Chief Counsel, IRS, Address to the Chicago Bar Ass'n Fed. Tax'n Comm.
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unnecessary and complex structures on ordinary business transactions in order
to achieve tax savings objectives. There is no reason whatsoever to incentivize
tax planning strategies among tax practitioners or taxpayers. In fact, there is
strong reason to discourage tax minimization planning as a deadweight loss to
society: it is inefficient and wasteful because it expends resources on devising
complicated structures to slip through the interstices of tax categories in order
to claim a more advantageous treatment than a straightforward transaction
would have merited, at a considerable cost to the federal fisc. 166 The direct
intent of tax minimization is to limit the ability of the government to collect
taxes from the taxpayer's activities, not to reinforce that ability. Thus,
incentivizing innovation in this area does not reinforce the proper functioning
of the tax laws, but runs counter to it.
b. Inappropriate Capture
In addition to asserting that innovation in tax planning must be a good
that should be encouraged, if tax planning is permissible at all, the IP bar also
insists that the patent laws would not damage the coherence of the tax system
by permitting patent trolls to monopolize areas of the law. 167 Let's consider
some ways that capture might occur in a harmful way. If a planning strategy
relates to a type of entity created by tax laws, then it may effectively capture an
area of the law such that any taxpayer undertaking a particular transaction
structure in order to come within an explicit tax-advantaged provision must
pay a royalty to the holder of the patent (or may be refused a license to do the
transaction). This would be true even when Congress enacted the provision to
encourage such transactions by making it possible for taxpayers to receive that
benefit. Partnerships, REMICs, real estate investment conduits, grantor trusts,
and other tax-created vehicles might potentially be captured in this way.
Many patent applications for such strategies would likely be considered
non-novel and obvious and would be appropriately rejected as ineligible for a
patent, 168 but some of these methods would likely survive the novelty and
obviousness tests. There are innumerable bright minds in the tax departments
of corporations, investment banks, and law firms, many of whom have come
up with new ideas in the financial derivatives and securitizations areas that
interpret the tax laws to govern combinations of known structures in non-
obvious ways. 169 A strategy most often will create transactions that require the
(Feb. 25, 2003), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/shelters-feb25.pdf.
166. See David Weisbach, It's Time to Get Serious About Shelters, 88 TAX NOTES 1677, 1677 (Sept.
25, 2000) ( "[T]ax planning deserves very little protection.").
167. See Worlds Collide, supra note 22, at 72 (arguing that compliance methods are no more of an issue
for tax than for any other discipline).
168. The SOGRAT patent is one example. See supra notes 6 and 74 and accompanying text. I have
suggested that the IRS may be able to assist the Patent Office in making these determinations through a
broader use of notices, including notices that demonstrate that strategies in patent claims are non-novel
extensions of settled law.
169. Indeed, since 1998, fifty-one tax strategy patents have been issued and eighty-five applications are
pending. Dustin Stamper, Tax Strategy Patents: A Problem Without Solutions?, http://www.taxanalysts.com/
www/website.nsf/Web/TaxStrategyPatents?OpenDocument (last visited Aug. 10, 2008).
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application of a number of different Code provisions, and any one new
provision may be relevant to a number of different structural transactions.
Drafters may have publicly discussed a particular application of a new Code
provision to a particular kind of transaction, but the types of transactions that
are likely to be patented may be quite different from those specifically
contemplated by the drafters, even though they may at the same time lead to
useful results not unlike the uses the drafters did contemplate. Examples might
include the invention of TruPS, a beneficial interest in a grantor trust that holds
certain junior subordinated debt interests and. is paid a preferred return out of
the cash flows of the trust, so that it is considered an "equity-flavored interest"
by credit agencies (although it is classed as debt for tax purposes), 170 or the
invention of "guaranteed maturity classes" of REMIC regular interests, which
permitted REMIC sponsors to issue REMIC debt with set maturities (unlike
prior analysis of the REMIC provisions). 171 The holder of a patent on the
process for developing the instruments would have acquired private control
over an area of the tax laws (certain REMICs; certain grantor trusts). The
value of the patent would increase to the extent that taxpayers are limited to
transactions encompassed within the patent or others held by the same patent
holder on related transactions.
There would even likely be a race to the Patent Office in connection with
each revision of the tax laws in that area, in an attempt to corner the patent
market on additional innovative transactions using the new provision that were
not obviously contemplated by the drafters. Given the complexity of the tax
laws, there are likely to be such new uses (in this sense, tax law is like
language-always ready to cover the unknown). That behavior could well
result in a few major players holding key patents in entire areas of the law,
such that any taxpayer engaging in ordinary activities in that area would need
to structure their transactions under one of the methods governed by the
patents. Unwary tax practitioners and taxpayers who did discover the method
independently might find themselves faced with expensive infringement
suits. 172  Yet the provisions were intended to provide certainty about tax
treatment of any instruments issued by these securitization vehicles that
satisfied the requirements for that classification and to benefit any taxpayers
that wanted to create such securitization vehicles. The only way to prevent
patent holders from cornering the market on new ways to carry out the intent
of Code provisions that are not explicitly contemplated (or easily derived by
experts from information about ones that are explicitly contemplated) at the
time the provisions are drafted appears to be to legislate a ban on tax strategy
170. See, e.g., Real Estate Trust Preferred Securities, Ocean Capital Pacific: Real Estate Trust Preferred
Securities, http://www.oceanpacificcapital.com/trupsfinancingphp (last visited July 20, 2008) (noting that
TruPS have characteristics of both debt and equity).
171. See Beale, Before the Return, supra note 11, at n. 15 and accompanying text.
172. Richard Gruner suggests that the IRS can prevent unsophisticated taxpayers from being trapped this
way by creating and maintaining a system for identifying and describing tax planning patents for the benefit of
taxpayers and tax advisers. See Worlds Collide, supra note 22, at 71. This suggestion has no merit. It would
be inappropriate for the IRS to serve as an agent of patent holders in advertising the strategies for taxpayers to
use to avoid paying taxes. It would also be inappropriate for the IRS to use its limited resources in this
fashion.
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patents.
The conventional patent wisdom seems to be turned on its head in respect
of the tax system. The basic requirements for patentability favor strong patent
protection for inventions that are likely to be of broad utility. In our
motorcycle helmet case, patents-and the concomitant ability to charge a
reasonable royalty-would be desirable even if the new helmet were so
advanced that individuals had no practical choice for complying with the
headgear requirement other than the new (and expensive) model. But it would
be fundamentally contrary to the intent and purposes of the tax system for a
patent to grant similar rights to an interpretation of tax laws governing a
particular strategy for structuring transactions, so that it cornered that legal
interpretation for all those intending to carry out similar transactions.
c. Core Concerns
There are three additional aspects of the private monopoly of tax laws
touched upon in this discussion that are cause for particular concern and merit
focused consideration.
(1) Fairness Concerns
The tax system is built around normatively important concepts that are
essential to its function even though not evident in every practical aspect. 173 I
have suggested that these normative concepts must be viewed as including an
external distributive justice principle that is "rooted in institutions of a
democratic polity based on personal liberty and equal respect."'
174
Contextualized to rate structures and bases, this distributive justice framework
supports a concept of fairness that is generally characterized as based on ability
to pay. Like-situated taxpayers should bear similar tax burdens (horizontal
equity) and better-off taxpayers should bear heavier burdens (vertical equity).
Thus, I have argued that customized tax planning in itself threatens distributive
justice because aggressive tax planning for those that can afford it reduces their
tax burdens and ultimately results in a heavier burden on others. 
175
IP attorneys argue that the fact that some taxpayers may be able to
execute licensing agreements with a tax strategy patentee while others will
have to forego taking advantage of the tax provisions governing the patented
tax strategy because they cannot afford a licensing agreement is little different
from the ability of some taxpayers to pay for sophisticated tax advice while
others must do without. 176 The distortive effect of tax patents is, however,
173. The normative ideal of the tax system is considered in contradistinction to the political reality of the
system with warts and all. This is similar to Noam Chomsky's linguistic distinction between the grammatical
and the acceptable. See NOAM CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAX (MIT Press 1965). The
normative concepts are present, even though not realized in every practical context. The practical context
translates back to the normative, however, and requires what I have called a "coherence-reinforcing"
interpretive approach.
174. Beale, Before the Return, supra note 11, at 592 n.22.
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., Worlds Collide, supra note 22, at 75 (suggesting that differential access because of patents
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much more severe than the availability to some taxpayers of hired tax advisers.
Whether or not a taxpayer uses sophisticated advisers, the taxpayer may
structure its transaction as desired and enjoy the resulting benefits if the
transaction falls within tax provisions providing a particular tax benefit. The
use of a tax adviser simply makes it more likely that the taxpayer will find tax-
advantaged ways to structure the transaction. The differential access may
relate to resources or to trade secrets, but it is not enforced by the government
nor is it absolute. Unlike the election to use tax planning assistance, however,
a tax patent may permit its holder to block all others from undertaking the
planning technique governed by the patent-essentially fencing off a way of
structuring a transaction based on an interpretation of a provision of law
intended to be available and equally applicable to all. Ironically, that right is
granted by the very government that sets the rules for determining tax
liabilities based on a claim of universal application, and requires every
taxpayer to determine their tax payments accordingly.
Further, the voluntary assessment that underlies the federal tax
administrative structure depends in large part upon taxpayers' respect for the
tax system and perception that it treats all taxpayers fairly. The existence of
tax strategy patents that provide a boon to some from a particular interpretation
of the laws that is not accessible to a taxpayer without paying a royalty-even
if the taxpayer developed the same interpretation on her own-directly
undercuts the perception of fairness necessary for voluntary assessment to
work. It undermines the integrity of the tax system.
(2) Institutional Concerns
A tax strategy patent puts an aspect of the tax laws under the control of
the patent holder rather than Congress. It makes access to certain tax-
advantaged transaction structures more costly (through a toll charge) or it
removes access completely if the patent holder determines not to license any
other taxpayers to use the strategy. As we have seen, IP commentators treat
this preemption concern lightly-"[t]o the extent that the law requires filing
tax returns for certain business transactions, entities should avoid the
transaction if the tax returns will run afoul of a patented strategy.' 77 These
key rights under the patent law directly conflict with the congressional role in
setting economic and tax policy through legislation and ultimately undermine
congressional authority. Patents on tax strategies ultimately gravely undermine
congressional authority.
This is perhaps more so today than ever before, as Congress has turned to
the tax code as a primary tool in establishing economic and even social policy.
Tax provisions are set to discourage some activities (e.g., gambling is
discouraged by prohibiting deductions for gambling losses in excess of
gambling winnings) 178 and encourages others (e.g., business investment is
should be viewed no differently than differential access because of decisions to hire tax advisers).
177. Osbom, supra note 23, at 50.
178. I.R.C. § 165(d) (2000).
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encouraged by providing cost recovery provisions that accelerate depreciation
deductions in comparison with actual economic depreciation).' 79 Patented tax
strategies could hinder the ability of Congress to legislate economic incentives
through the Code, thwarting congressional purpose.
Some might dislike Congress's tendency to use the tax Code to legislate
its economic policies and prefer that Congress would legislate its economic
policies and favors for various constituencies separately from the enactment of
tax laws. Although such an approach might well be preferable in an ideal
legislative system, it does not accord with the practical realities of today's
political context. Adding tax patents to the issues that compromise and
complicate the enactment of tax laws and considerations of appropriate
economic policies is not advisable.
Even assuming arguendo that licensing arrangements result in no
excessive rent extraction in the setting of royalties, the availability of patents
undermines a fundamental premise of using the tax laws as a key factor in
economic planning. Consider an economic stimulus package that is intended
to operate for some period of time. Assume that over time, various patents are
granted that capture a significant portion of the potential transactions and
thereby limit the availability of the stimulus primarily to those paying a royalty
to the patent holder. The existence of tax strategy patents effectively acts to
divert a significant portion of the benefit from the stimulus: the patent holder,
who is not the intended recipient of the benefit, receives a substantial portion
of the benefit in the form of a royalty, and the taxpayers who are the intended
recipients lose an equivalent amount. 180 To add insult to injury, diversion of
those tax savings from the intended recipients to patent holders is regarded by
the patent system as an appropriate reward for the costs of developing
innovations to thwart the congressional intent.
Another case illustrating the thwarting of congressional intent is tax
legislation that contemplates extraction of higher taxes through provisions that
discourage certain conduct. Such provisions have two purposes-raising
additional federal revenues and discouraging undesirable activity. Assume,
again, that a tax guru develops an innovative tax planning method that
circumvents the tax legislation. In this case, the existence of the tax strategy
patent acts to privatize the revenue stream intended for the government,
without deterring the activity that Congress had determined to be undesirable.
(3) Professional Concerns
Interpreting the numerous yet finite tax provisions to apply to the infinite
variety of new activities that humans engage in is not easy, and for that tax
lawyers develop expertise, attend conferences, write articles and books, and
179. Id. §§ 168, 179.
180. The marginal rate of the taxpayer utilizing a patented tax planning method will determine the ceiling
on the royalty charged by the patentee. The taxpayer will have no motivation to enter into a license agreement
if the royalty extracted exceeds the tax savings. Under ordinary market conditions, the patentee would "share"
the savings with the taxpayer, so that the patentee profits from the royalty, and the taxpayer pays a royalty that
is somewhat less than the tax liability that would have otherwise applied.
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engage in professional panel discussions of the appropriate interpretation of tax
laws. The idea that those interpretations could be patentable clearly strikes tax
lawyers as "absurd," as Wolfman notes. 181 Tax practitioners are wary of the
new burdens that researching tax patents will impose on them, the additional
costs for their clients, and the additional complications that patents will impose
on an already complex set of tax rules, making it harder to assist client
compliance.1 If those were the only professional issues, I might complain
about the change, but still accept it as inevitable. It would be dissatisfying if
the tax bar's indignity were merely aroused by the necessity of sharing a
lucrative tax planning fee with a patent holder, as some of the more
intemperate IP commentary has suggested.
183
Patenting tax strategies, however, will likely bring more detrimental
consequences for the profession. If tax strategies are patentable, "patent
prospectors" will increasingly hang out at professional meetings with hopes of
coming upon a new strategy that can be mined for patent gold. 184 This will
likely discourage public dialogue among professionals about novel
interpretations of the law. Because trade secrets are not often revealed at
public meeting sessions until some period after their development, those
conversations are already somewhat restrained. Patent competition will likely
impose additional constraints on the flow of information to the public and to
government officials.
A significant corollary of the more limited interchange among tax
professionals that could result from the proliferation of tax planning method
patents is the lack of opportunity for tax professionals to test their ideas about
interpretations of the tax law among their peers. That could lead to a form of
balkanization-firms would develop specialty interpretations through internal
discussion and analysis, but those interpretations would not be vetted through
discussion with peers in the larger practitioner community. Over time, those
insular interpretations, having been relied upon for particular deal structures,
would be likely to be treated as settled, even though they lacked the deeper
scrutiny currently undertaken. Firms might be less willing to pull back from a
questionable interpretation, even when they began to discuss them with others,
because of the transactions already executed for clients.
Similarly, patenting of tax strategies will likely spur competition for
clients and for status as a recognized innovator rewarded with tax patents. The
IP bar sees this signaling of status as an innovator as a benefit of the incentive
system established by patent law. 185
181. Wolfnan,supra note 13, at 505.
182. See Drennan, supra note 135, at 283-85 (discussing the social costs of tax patents).
183. See Koresko Law Firm, supra note 25, at 2-3 (blaming the concerns about tax strategy patents on
special interest lobbying by tax planners mostly concerned with the impact of royalties on their advising fees).
184. The term "patent prospector" is one of a cluster of derogatory terms, including "patent troll" or
"patent pirate," used to describe patent holders as ones who prey on productive society in order to benefit from
lucrative patents for processes that they did not discover.
185. See Osbom, supra note 23, at 43-44; Gruner statement, supra note 27 (suggesting positive benefits
from patents generally include "signaling" the expertise of the inventor, differentiating the product of the
inventor from competitors' products, channeling competitors' actions away from the activities of the inventor
(or extracting "handsome royalties"), signaling future innovation strengths to customers and competitors,
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[I]f a firm can count on patent protections for a new and highly
innovative tax planning strategy, the firm will be able to afford to
devote greater resources to the development of the method knowing
that all taxpayers who wish the benefit of using the method will need
to pay a royalty to gain this advantage. Under this latter type of
system, the full range of taxpayer advantages from a given new
technique will define the extent of development expenditures that are
justified in producing it. It will also encourage firms to focus on the
types of highly innovative, nonobvious extensions of prior designs
that are capable of qualifying for patents .... This last analysis
suggests why patents on tax planning methods ... may ultimately be
beneficial to this field. 1
86
I would argue, however, that the signaling advantages to firms that
become known as patent innovators is a detriment to the professionalism of
attorneys and to the proper functioning of the tax system as a central institution
necessary to a functioning democratic government. The innovation fallacy
inaccurately appraises the value of innovation in tax.
First, as many other tax commentators have indicated, tax advisers
already have ample incentive to innovate. 187 They are hired to help structure
their client's activities in a way that will minimize taxation. They compete
with other firms on the basis of their ability to deliver. Firms already achieve
"tax guru" status for having devised complicated strategies to deal with special
situations. Innovation is, in other words, alive and well in the tax profession.
Recognizing this sentiment of the tax bar, IP commentators tend to argue
that the additional incentives to innovate provided by patents will nonetheless
"bring[] the level of innovation to a more optimal point." 88 This patent law
bias towards innovation overlooks the negative impact of innovation in fields
such as tax. It is important to balance the tax minimization norm with a duty to
the court, which I believe should be interpreted to require a coherence-
reinforcing approach to the law. 189  The availability of patents for tax
minimization planning unbalances the endeavor, pushing towards a lopsided
emphasis on planning at the cost of the tax system.
Furthermore, increasing the incentives to innovate in tax could well
trigger another cycle of abusive tax shelter planning. The tax shelter
promotions of the late 1970s and the 1990s were costly in diverting revenues
from the government to shelter promoters and in requiring the expenditure of
limited resources in the Treasury Department and IRS to counter the shelter
trend. 190 This last cycle resulted in the reportable transaction rules that were
codified and reinforced with penalty provisions and stricter tax shelter opinion
increasing innovation specialization, and rewarding innovators over non-innovators).
186. Gruner statement, supra note 27.
187. See, e.g., Drennan, supra note 134, at 235-36 (arguing that no patent protection is necessary as
further incentive to innovate).
188. Osborn, supra note 23, at 43.
189. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
190. Daniel N. Shaviro, Commentary, Evaluating the Social Costs of Corporate Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L.
REv. 445,446-47 (2002).
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requirements as part of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004.191 Another
cost of tax shelter activity is an increased number of anti-abuse provisions in
the tax laws, further complicating compliance for the majority of taxpayers
who do not engage in aggressive tax planning.
Second, if the developments in the interpretations of obviousness and
subject matter patentability do not lead the Patent Office to reject pure tax
strategy patents, the signaling effect of patents could lead to cross-licensing
agreements among a few very large legal conglomerates that effectively
control the tax strategy patent market. Tax practitioners not associated with
those legal conglomerates would find themselves on the fringes of tax practice.
They might be prevented from providing interpretations of the tax laws in most
areas in which corporations or sophisticated taxpayers had interests, acting
primarily as referrals to patent holders for licensing agreements. Again, the
concentration of interpretive power in a few hands would be detrimental to the
tax profession, to the integrity of the tax system, and to our democratic
institutions. One can imagine a resurgence in the conglomerates of maverick
groups such as the KPMG tax services groups that became cavalier about
compliance with disclosure requirements. The power of an elite few over
existing patents would likely tend to biased interpretations of the tax laws
towards interpretations favorable to additional patents.
Third (and perhaps most important), innovations in minimizing tax
liabilities are not a public good, even when they are not related to abusive tax193
shelter transactions. Instead, they are countenanced by the tax system as a
natural concomitant of any tax system that cannot be entirely prevented. The
tax minimization norm prevalent among tax practitioners is, however, actively
discouraged by disclosure rules, disqualified opinion rules, and special
(onerous) written opinion rules and other requirements intended to
disincentivize tax practitioners from advising taxpayers to undertake
aggressive tax transactions. 194 I have argued that additional measures should
be undertaken to further discourage the tax minimization norm among tax
practitioners, because it pushes tax practitioners to focus on tax innovation
instead of focusing on coherence-reinforcing interpretations of the law.
Accordingly, I recommended that a better balance would be achieved between
tax practitioners' duties to their clients and their duty to uphold the law with
the adoption of a uniform more-likely-than-not confidence level for taxpayers'
and tax advisers' reporting positions. 195 Congress enacted such a change to the
191. American Jobs creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, §§ 812, 815-16, 819, 118 Stat. 1418,
1577-84 (2004).
192. S. Rep. 109-54, at 6 (2005).
193. Cf Osbom, supra note 23, at 44-45 (suggesting that tax opposition to greater innovation is based
solely on concerns that patent innovations will lead to abusive transactions). In contrast, the arguments I have
made do not rest solely on concerns about abusive transactions but rather on the importance to the tax system
and profession of striving for coherence and maintaining a balance between duties to clients and duties to the
integrity of the law.
194. See supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
195. See generally Beale, Before the Return, supra note 11 (arguing that evidentiary privileges should be
denied for pre-retum tax planning and confidence levels required for reporting positions on retums should be
raised across the board to a more likely than not standard).
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standard applicable under Code Section 6694 to tax return preparers in
2007.196 Thus, there is a clearly discernible trend in the actions of the Treasury
Department, the IRS, and Congress towards increasing transparency,
heightening standards, and discouraging aggressive tax planning-not
encouraging it. That appropriate attitude towards tax minimization innovations
cannot be compared to the clear social benefit of development of new life-
saving drugs that will become available to the world upon expiration of a
patent and that may remain available for decades or even centuries (as in the
case of the lowly aspirin). In fact, the Gruner statement quoted above
describes a tax administrator's worst nightmare-patents threaten to undo the
progress achieved over a decade of fighting corporate tax shelters and
discouraging law and accounting firms from marketing tax strategies by over-
rewarding tax minimization planning.
V. CONCLUSION
Patent law is premised on the concept of incentivizing innovation for the
public good. The patent-centric view is that innovations in tax reduction
strategies are likewise an overall good. The benefits will resemble those that
are assumed to result from innovations in financial services, including
increased risk taking and a skewing of efforts towards patentable activities and
away from older business activities.
Tax law, on the other hand, is premised on providing certainty regarding
the tax treatment of a taxpayer's undertakings, so that the taxpayer can
appropriately report activities and make payment in respect of the tax liabilities
that ensue from having undertaken them. Patents not only provide an
unnecessary incentive to encourage tax minimization innovation, but they also
provide an incentive that is directly counterproductive to the fundamental
underlying policies of the tax laws. There is no inherit merit in tax reduction
strategies and no overall public good from tax innovation. The polity would be
better served if those sophisticated taxpayers who devote considerable
resources to arranging their affairs to minimize their tax burdens would spend
that energy and those resources on non-tax matters germane to their business.
Learned Hand's famous statement that "[a]nyone may so arrange his affairs
that his taxes shall be as low as possible"'1 97 has been taken as a tax
minimization creed by tax practitioners, yet they often forget that the statement
is part of the seminal case in the development of the judicial doctrine of
economic substance, permitting courts to find that transactions undertaken
solely to achieve tax planning results are a sham.
In these times, we might even pause to reconsider the wholehearted
endorsement of incentives beyond the tax system for innovations that directly
impact financial institutions and fiscal systems. Financial services innovation
and excessive risk-taking are undoubtedly underlying factors in the current
196. See Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat. 190
(2007).
197. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935).
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economic crisis. Investment banks devised increasingly risky derivatives and
securitization vehicles. They used these instruments to move assets off their
books in innovative ways. They originated risky subprime mortgage loans but
innovated ways that were considered to shift the primary risk of loss to
investors. Those innovations reduced the ability of mortgagors to negotiate
modifications when their homes' values slipped below the principal due, and
reduced the incentive for banks to undertake prudent lending activities without
overleveraging their own obligations. Creating those kinds of incentives in the
tax system could be equally detrimental. In some IP commentators' visions of
the future, tax patents will provide the spur to the development of ever more
sophisticated means of tax reduction. If it were accepted that innovation in this
area were a public good, the advent of tax patents would likely be considered a
boon by others as well because of the incentive effect for innovation.
I am convinced, however, that it is contrary to the public interest to
encourage further innovations in tax planning. It deprives the fisc of funds,
encourages taxpayers to be ever less compliant in reporting their tax liabilities,
and ultimately perpetuates a deleterious tax minimization norm among tax
professionals that hinders the development of an appropriate coherence-
reinforcing view of the tax laws. Similarly, while the signaling effect of
patents is a desired corollary of innovations that contribute to the public good,
the signaling afforded by the patent system to tax strategy patents would
merely deepen the negative effects of excessive tax minimization planning, as
those firms that are most aggressive in developing tax minimization techniques
will be the ones rewarded with the reputational boost. Tax patents bring both
systems to a crossroads-and that crossroads is a place of conflict because the
bedrock principle of patented monopoly rights undermines the fundamental
purpose of fair tax collection. Patents on tax strategies simply should not be
permitted.
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